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Copyright’s derivative right gives an author the exclusive
right to prepare adaptations of copyrighted works, preventing
competitors from preparing unauthorized sequels and other
transformations. Competition among authors for consumers interested in the same subject matter thus exists only where the
derivative right does not extend. No one can hold a copyright on
broad plot themes, and so there was no violation of copyright
when Hollywood studios in 1998 produced two separate movies
about asteroids hitting the earth.1 Similarly, no one can hold a
copyright on historical figures,2 and Hollywood plans eventually to produce three movies about Alexander the Great,3 plus
as many as four about Ernesto Che Guevara.4 No one holds the
copyright anymore on the French novel Les Liaisons Dangereuses, a book which has led to at least four movies so far.5 And
because no one held a copyright on Amy Fisher, television net-

1. See DEEP IMPACT (Paramount Pictures 1998). But don’t see ARMA(Touchstone Pictures 1998).
2. The right of personality may provide some limited protection for recent historical figures, though there is controversy over whether the right of
personality should survive the death of the person. See Edward J. Damich,
The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the Protection of the Moral
Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1, 93–94 (1988) (discussing whether the right
of personality passes to heirs after death).
3. See Dana Harris, Alexander the Grating: Another Macedonian on the
March, VARIETY, Nov. 24–30, 2003, at 5.
4. See Dana Harris, Four Guevaras? Che Sera!, VARIETY, July 21–27,
2003, at 5.
5. See CRUEL INTENTIONS (Columbia Pictures 1999); DANGEROUS LIAISONS (Warner Bros. 1988); VALMONT (MGM, Inc. 1989); LES LIAISONS DANGEREUSES (Les Films Marceau 1959).
GEDDON
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works produced three different dramatizations about the Long
Island Lolita.6
If the derivative right did not exist, these would not be isolated anecdotes. Instead, there would be far more examples of
competition for consumers interested in similar subject matter.
While Warner Brothers may produce one Harry Potter movie
for each book in the series,7 competitors cannot produce an additional three or four movies per book. Similarly, the derivative
right ensures that while J.K. Rowling may fulfill her promise to
create seven books in the series if she so desires,8 other authors
will not be able to create alternative sequels without her permission.9 The literature on the derivative right has treated the
reduction in the number of works using the same copyrighted
expression as a loss, though perhaps a justifiable incentive for
authors to create works that might spawn derivatives. This Article argues, however, that the suppression of competition in
creating adaptations of copyrighted works might instead be the
derivative right’s chief economic virtue.
The argument is counterintuitive, because from the perspective of consumer welfare, more is merrier. No consumer is
required to read or view any of the Harry Potter books or movies, and a consumer could decide to consume only the officially
authorized works. Harry’s most ardent fans might be delighted
if every major movie studio made its own version of each Harry
Potter book. Consumers, however, might well be better-off
without such competition. First, while some of these films
might be of high quality, the rush to create Harry Potter adap6. Linda Saslow, The Victim Forgives. Others Wish to Forget. Freedom
Looms for Amy Fisher, and the Island Groans, N.Y. TIMES, April 11, 1999,
§ 14LI, at 1.
7. So far, there has been one movie for each of the first four books in the
series. See HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE (Warner Bros. 2001);
HARRY POTTER AND THE CHAMBER OF SECRETS (Warner Bros. 2002); HARRY
POTTER AND THE PRISONER OF AZKABAN (Warner Bros. 2004); HARRY POTTER
AND THE GOBLET OF FIRE (Warner Bros. 2005).
8. The books so far are J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE (1997); J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE CHAMBER OF
SECRETS (1998); J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE PRISONER OF AZKABAN (1999); J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE GOBLET OF FIRE (2000);
J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE ORDER OF THE PHOENIX (2003); and
J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE HALF-BLOOD PRINCE (2005).
9. Indeed, at least one court has held that the derivative right extends
far enough to bar a book involving another character whose experiences seem
similar to Harry Potter’s. See JK Wins ‘Tanya Grotter’ Court Case, BBC
NEWSROUND, Apr. 3, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/cbbcnews/hi/uk/newsid_
2914000/2914331.stm.
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tations might lower quality, as each studio makes sacrifices to
get its product onto the screen quickly. Second, substantial
time lags may maximize consumer excitement; a movie version
of Harry Potter shortly following publication might have reduced the benefits of anticipation.10
The derivative right thus can be defended as a tool that allows authors to take their time. Less obviously, but perhaps
just as importantly, the derivative right may enhance social
welfare, even placing aside the potentially destructiveness of
copyright races. The resources that are invested in copyrighted
works sometimes might produce greater social returns if invested in other copyrighted works or elsewhere in the economy.11 Movie studios presumably have limited budgets, and so
they would have to sacrifice some other films to make the additional Harry Potter movie adaptations. Even if a Harry Potter
adaptation presented a profit opportunity for which the studios
could raise additional capital and expand their production
budgets, the funds for producing an additional Harry Potter
movie must come from somewhere. With more investment in
Harry Potter derivatives, we will have less investment elsewhere in the economy.
Would we be better off in a world with more Harry Potter
and less of everything else? The question is, of course, an empirical one. Nonetheless, there is a strong theoretical reason to
expect that, as a general matter, producers of works sometimes
have inefficient incentives to create close substitutes of existing
works rather than more original works. Suppose, for example,
that a movie studio expects to make just a little more profit
from producing yet another Harry Potter adaptation than from
producing a movie based on a script involving some new character, call him Troy P. Rather (an anagram for Harry Potter).
In a world without the derivative right, the producer will
choose the Harry Potter movie. But many viewers of this movie
might have been almost as content to see one of the other adap10. The maxim that good things come to those who wait seems even more
obvious for the Lord of the Rings trilogy. See, e.g., John Marks, Goodbye, Darth
Vader. Hello, Gandalf: Will Lord of the Rings Be the Next Retro Hit?, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 10, 1997, at 56 (reporting that film rights to the
trilogy were finally on the verge of being licensed). Studios might not have
been willing to devote the enormous investment this project required if numerous cheaper unauthorized adaptations of the work had already existed.
11. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 487–88 (1996) (noting that to create additional works, resources must be stripped from other sectors of the economy).
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tations if this additional adaptation had not been created. As a
result, the new adaptation may result in a lower increment to
consumer welfare than the project with Troy P. Rather. The
general problem is that, in a world without the derivative right,
unauthorized derivative works will tend to be close substitutes
for the authorized derivative works. And they will tend to be
even closer substitutes for other unauthorized derivative
works. Thus, sales of unauthorized derivative works are more
likely than sales of original works to come at the expense of
other works, and there will be an incentive that nudges authors
toward inefficiently high levels of imitation.
There are possible objections to this argument, but none
can refute the possibility that by suppressing the production of
close economic substitutes beyond the number that the copyright owner agrees to allow, the derivative right might improve
consumer welfare. One objection is that the most die-hard fans
of Harry Potter will see and presumably benefit from all of the
Harry Potter adaptations, and they may receive consumer surplus well above the cost of admission. An objection on the flip
side is that some of the viewers of the Troy P. Rather movie
presumably would see this movie instead of other movies that
would have made them almost equally happy.
The answer to both objections is the same. At least as a
general matter, the greater the extent to which a product has
close economic substitutes, the less consumers will benefit from
the introduction of the additional product. The percentage of
viewers of the zillionth Harry Potter adaptation who would
have been almost as happy with some other movie will probably be greater than the corresponding percentage of viewers of
the first Troy P. Rather film. To be sure, this is not an inevitable fact. Perhaps the Troy P. Rather movie, though involving a
new character, will in fact be so unoriginal that it will have
more close substitutes than the new Harry Potter adaptation.
At least on average, however, adaptations will be closer economic substitutes for one another than other works will be for
one another. When a movie studio or other creator of copyrighted works is choosing between two possible marginal
works, if one work would be an adaptation of another work and
the second work would not be, on average the adaptation will
have closer economic substitutes than the nonadaptation. The
two works might appear to promise roughly equal profit, but
the adaptation is likely to reduce the profits of other works by
more and have lesser social value. The derivative right pre-

ABRAMOWICZ_3FMT

322

12/22/2005 10:49:18 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:317

vents the creation of an unauthorized adaptation and steers
creators of copyrighted content to more original, more socially
valuable works.
The possibility that copyright law might result in the production of too many works has received considerable attention
in recent years, as recognized by at least six different scholars.12 My analysis in this Article, however, does not depend on
the premise that there are too many copyrighted works. Even if
we conclude that we have few copyrighted works overall, in the
absence of the derivative right there might be excessive use of
particular instances of copyrighted expression, such as popular
fictional characters. The production of unauthorized derivatives
may produce relatively little social value while steering creative resources from more original applications and causing the
original author to rush official adaptations that will be lower
quality than they otherwise would be. Authors may still authorize a large number of adaptations. The derivative right,
however, may prevent much greater redundancy at relatively
little cost to free speech.13
The derivative right to prepare sequels and adaptations, I
will argue, is best understood not solely as a means of furthering the incentive to create works, but more significantly as a
means of providing an author control over the release of adaptations and limiting the production of adaptations that would
be close substitutes for one another. An important corollary to
this explanation of the derivative right is that it may provide
some justification for the long copyright term. The derivative
right is just one of the rights of copyright, and the most important right is the reproduction right, the exclusive right to prepare copies of copyrighted works; it is this right that, at least in
theory, prevents pirates from selling exact copies of copyrighted
works without prior permission from the copyright owner. The
derivative right increases in its importance relative to the reproduction right later in the copyright term, when fewer people
will tend to be interested in the original work and more people
will tend to be interested in sequels and other adaptations.14
12. See infra Part I.A.
13. I consider the free speech issue below but leave open the possibility
that free speech might demand abolition of the derivative right even if this
would have negative welfare consequences. See infra Part I.C.
14. I do not mean to suggest that the reproduction right lacks value late
in the copyright term. Even an old movie might still make some money from
DVD sales and perhaps even occasionally from a limited theatrical rerelease.
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This Article’s theory, unlike an incentive justification, could
justify even retroactive extensions of the copyright term. At the
least, preservation of the derivative right likely reflects the actual motivation of companies that sought the long copyright
term. Of course, this Article’s theory can contribute to a justification only of a long copyright term for the derivative right.
Perhaps the derivative right and the reproduction right, which
have become essentially interchangeable in copyright doctrine,
should be more clearly separated, and the copyright term
should be longer for the derivative right than for the reproduction right.
This seems unlikely in the near future, but the analytical
exercise of distinguishing the derivative and reproduction
rights could have immediate doctrinal benefits. By providing an
economic foundation for the derivative right, borrowing from
the rent dissipation literature that has proven analytically useful in patent analysis, this Article’s analysis points to a
straightforward doctrinal test for the derivative right. This test
focuses on competition among potential derivative works rather
than on competition between such works and the original work.
Even assuming the copyright term remains the same for both
the derivative and the reproduction right, this test at least has
the potential to resolve significant doctrinal confusion concerning the derivative right’s scope. At the same time, the Article’s
analysis suggests that a doctrinal test for the reproduction
right should insist, as a prerequisite to protection, that there be
some competition between the allegedly infringing work and
the allegedly infringed work. By more clearly delineating the
derivative from the reproduction right, we may avoid applications of each that fail to reflect the underlying purposes of
these rights.
Part I of this Article explains and questions the conventional justification of the derivative right, that the right provides incentives to create copyrighted works. The derivative
right probably greatly decreases the number of derivative
works, and so the right is unlikely to maximize the total num-

Once a number of viewers have already experienced the original work, however, the proportion of value attributable to the reproduction right will decline.
Suppose the copyright on a movie is initially worth $100 million, including $50
million attributable to expected sales of the movie itself and $50 million attributable to expected sales of sequels. After $40 million in tickets are sold,
only $10 million of the remaining $60 million unrealized value of the movie
copyright will be attributable to the reproduction right.
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ber of works. The conventional argument can be salvaged, Part
I argues, only by recognizing that some works may be more important than others, in part because works that are close substitutes for one another are of relatively little value. Part I also
shows that copyright’s reproduction right not only bans exact
copying, but has been interpreted sufficiently broadly such that
it substantially overlaps the derivative right. This Part concludes by critiquing Jed Rubenfeld’s suggestion for differentiating the reproduction and derivative rights, an approach that
would replace the derivative right with a liability rule.
Part II reviews the recent literature applying product differentiation theory to copyright and points to an additional
area of the economic literature that may provide a more fruitful
model for considering the derivative right. The copyright-andproduct-differentiation literature reveals that authors sometimes will have an incentive to create a work, thus entering a
market for some genre of copyrighted works, even if the entry
reduces social welfare. The intuition underlying this point is
that the primary effect of some works will be to effect “demand
diversion,” that is to divert consumers from other products from
which they might have received almost as much utility, rather
than to satisfy untapped demand. The insights of the literature
so far have been applied to copyright in general, and the theory
alone cannot tell us whether we have too many works or too
few in total.
The logic, however, may apply particularly forcefully to
discrete submarkets in which there would be a large amount of
demand diversion, as would be the case if no derivative right
existed. Rent dissipation theory, which previously has proven
useful for analyzing the dynamics of innovation in the patent
system, also can serve as a useful vehicle for exploring the derivative right. Rent dissipation theory relaxes two assumptions
of the copyright-and-product-differentiation literature: that
product space is of constant density, and that there are no races
to place products in particular points in product space. Product
space may become particularly crowded in some areas, and the
derivative right will tend to even out the density of product
space, resulting in fewer works exploiting the same expression
and more relatively original works. The derivative right also
eliminates copyright races to create adaptations, allowing the
original author time to create a relatively high-quality work
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and to build audience anticipation. Other doctrines, such as
copyright’s protection of characters and the long copyright
term, also make more sense given this justification.
Part III suggests doctrinal implications of the theory developed. Regardless of whether the derivative right in its current form ultimately is normatively justified, the right needs a
conceptual economic foundation to restrict its doctrinal contours. The conventional justification of the derivative right,
that it encourages production of new works, has no limiting
principle. This Article’s account, by contrast, casts the derivative right itself as the limiting principle to the general rule allowing free entry into markets for copyrighted works. By clarifying that the danger against which the derivative right guards
is not primarily reduction in authors’ incentives, the theory can
counsel against applications of the derivative right that do not
serve a significant economic function. In turn, by clarifying that
the danger against which the reproduction right guards is reduction in authors’ incentives, the theory can counsel against
applications of that right that do not advance such a goal. Part
III thus offers a doctrinal approach for assessing the derivative
and reproduction right, justifies that approach with attention
to the wording of the Copyright Act itself, applies the test to
some actual cases and other controversies, and comments on
the related doctrine concerning the standard for copyrightability of derivative works.
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DERIVATIVE RIGHT
Under the Copyright Act, a copyright owner has, among
rights, both the right to “reproduce the copyrighted work in
copies or phonorecords,”15 and the right “to prepare derivative
works based upon the copyrighted work.”16 The phrase “derivative work” is defined in the Act’s definition section as follows:
a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole,
represent an original work of authorship, is a “derivative work”.17

15. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (Supp. II 2002).
16. Id. § 106(2).
17. Id. § 101.
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The definition thus leaves little doubt that a movie version of a
book would be covered, and it is uncontroversial that a sequel
to a book or movie similarly would count as a transformation or
an adaptation.18
In the vast majority of cases, the scope of these rights is
clear, and many of the interesting questions concern whether
someone can claim “fair use” in violating these rights.19 The derivative right, however, does raise two important questions:
First, what is its purpose? And second, how can it be distinguished from the reproduction right in cases in which the creation of an adaptation also involves the copying of some expression from the original work? Part I.A will argue that the classic
defense of the derivative right, that it provides incentives to
create new works, is at least overstated. Part I.B will note that
the reproduction right has been interpreted to extend beyond
exact reproductions and to overlap the derivative right substantially. The derivative right’s breadth also demands some
justification.
A. THE PUZZLING DERIVATIVE RIGHT
Commentators explain the derivative right with the same
incentive rationale generally applied to justify copyright as a
whole.20 Paul Goldstein, for example, uses Gone with the
Wind21 to explain how the derivative right extends copyright’s
basic logic.22 Copyright’s reproduction right provided Margaret
18. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1274
(11th Cir. 2001) (noting that a book sequel counts as a derivative work).
19. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (providing for a fair use defense); infra note
81 and accompanying text (considering whether a parody is protected as a
“fair use”).
20. See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 409, 428 (2002) (“The primary policy justification for copyright protection
in the United States is the incentive justification.”). The Supreme Court has
recognized the need to provide incentives to create copyrighted works as justifying the exclusive right. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (stating that copyright is “intended to motivate the
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward”). The right cannot be unlimited, however, because of the need to ensure
access to copyrighted works. See, e.g., id. (noting that the limited copyright
term eventually ensures “the public access to the products of their genius”); see
also Alireza Jay Naghavi & Gunther G. Schulze, Bootlegging in the Music Industry: A Note, 12 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 57, 62–63 (2001) (providing an economic
explanation of the tension between static and dynamic efficiency in copyright).
21. MARGARET MITCHELL, GONE WITH THE WIND (1936).
22. See Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 216–17 (1983); see also PAUL GOLD-
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Mitchell and her publisher an incentive to “invest time and
money in writing, editing, producing and promoting the popular novel, . . . knowing that no one may copy the work’s expressive content without their consent.”23 In contrast, the derivative
right “enables prospective copyright owners to proportion their
investment in a work’s expression to the returns expected not
only from the market in which the copyrighted work is first
published, but from other, derivative markets as well.”24
Mitchell and her publisher “can hope to monopolize not only the
sale of the novel’s hardcover and paperback editions, but also
the use of the novel’s expressive elements in translations, motion pictures and countless other derivative formats.”25 The
copyright owner’s ability to exploit a copyrighted work not just
through exclusive reproduction, but also through adaptation to
various derivative formats, increases the potential returns from
creation of a copyrighted work. The derivative right thus allows
a prospective copyright owner to “proportion . . . investment”
accordingly.26
There are two ways that the derivative right might increase investment in the creation of copyrighted works, though
in each case the effects of the derivative right on investment
may be small. First, the derivative right could lead someone
who otherwise would not have created a copyrighted work to
create one. For someone who is unsure of whether to write a
book, the possibility of royalties from adaptations conceivably
could be the decisive consideration. A problem with this explanation is that revenues from adaptations ex ante may be far
more significant for some works than others. The works most
likely to be adapted—John Grisham novels, for example27—are
STEIN,

COPYRIGHT § 5.3 (2d ed. Supp. 2002) (repeating the analysis). Goldstein’s choice of an example anticipates a later case, Suntrust Bank, that considered the circumstances in which the fair use doctrine can overcome the derivative right, 268 F.3d at 1257. See infra note 80 and accompanying text
(discussing this case in detail).
23. Goldstein, supra note 22, at 216.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. It is possible, of course, that Grisham would have written fewer books
if he were able only to exploit the books themselves. Whether John Grisham
would have produced fewer or more books if he received no compensation for
movie rights depends on the balance of income and substitution effects. Cf. J.
E. Stiglitz & P. Dasgupta, Differential Taxation, Public Goods, and Economic
Efficiency, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 151, 159 (1971) (claiming that income tax increases sometimes lead workers to work more rather than less). In effect, the
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likely to be so successful in and of themselves that they will be
inframarginal works, i.e., works that would be produced anyway, not works where financial factors make authors close to
indifferent about whether to create them. Of course, sometimes
works of which little is expected end up being bestsellers, and
the fantasy of fame, fortune, and film adaptations may drive
some yet unheralded writers.28 Publishers, moreover, may implicitly factor in the possibility of revenues from derivative
rights even where these revenues are unlikely; even if an author retains film rights, adaptation might increase sales of the
original, perhaps explaining the lamentable practice of placing
movie stills on the covers of books that have been adapted. In
sum, derivative rights presumably do have some effect on the
number of works created, but probably a large number of
works, and especially a large number of the works most likely
to be adapted, would be created even in the absence of derivative rights.
Second, the derivative right might lead someone to invest
more in a copyrighted work to preserve and maximize opportunities for adaptation. Consider, for example, Laura Hillenbrand, whose nonfiction best-seller Seabiscuit29 became a
movie.30 Hillenbrand insists that in developing the initial book
proposal for Seabiscuit, which was based in turn on an earlier
article that she had written,31 the possibility of a movie never
occurred to her,32 suggesting that she would have written the
book even in the absence of the derivative right to film adaptaexistence of the derivative right increased Grisham’s revenues per book, and it
is possible that Grisham might have made so much money from his first few
works that he chose to allocate more time to leisure than he would have if he
had made less money. The Grisham example, however, also suggests that if
copyright law were suddenly to eliminate derivative rights, authors who have
previously profited from them might no longer see it as worth their while to
keep writing, as the expected royalties from subsequent works would be only a
small percentage of royalties already received.
28. Markets for copyrighted works are sometimes described as winnertake-all markets, in which the most successful contributors receive a high portion of total profits. See ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNERTAKE-ALL SOCIETY 9 (1995) (“Book publishing is a lottery of the purest sort,
with a handful of best-selling authors receiving more than $10 million per
book while armies of equally talented writers earn next to nothing.”).
29. LAURA HILLENBRAND, SEABISCUIT: AN AMERICAN LEGEND (2001).
30. SEABISCUIT (Universal Studios 2003).
31. See Laura Hillenbrand, Four Good Legs Between Us, AM. HERITAGE,
July/August, 1998, at 39.
32. See Michael Neff, An Interview with Laura Hillenbrand, WEB DEL
SOL, 2002, http://webdelsol.com/f-SolPix.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
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tion. Hillenbrand, however, ended up with a movie contract before writing the book,33 and it is plausible to imagine that she
devoted more time to researching and writing the book once she
knew that the book would become a movie. Of course, Hillenbrand would have had incentives to write a strong book in any
event, so it is difficult to ascertain the extent of the effect. More
generally, the derivative right may tend to steer investment of
both time and money to works that are most likely to be
adapted, potentially increasing the quality both of those works
and of the adaptations as well.
Though these effects are modest, if they were the only consequences of the derivative right, the incentives case for the derivative right would remain strong. The derivative right, however, can also decrease the number of new works by reducing
the number of adaptations. If there were no derivative right,
anyone could write a sequel to a book or adapt the book into a
film, and we might end up with numerous adaptations rather
than with just a small number. Uncopyrighted works often result in more adaptations than copyrighted works.34 While we
cannot be sure how many movie versions of Harry Potter would
exist in the absence of the derivative right, it seems plausible
that there might be a fair number, and Harry Potter aficionados
would argue about which movie was the best one. At least, it is
certain that there would be many written adaptations of Harry
Potter, as amateur authors presumably would create a large
number of unauthorized sequels and adaptations to other cultural contexts.35
The incentives justification for the derivative right thus
rests on an enthymematic and uncertain empirical claim, that
the increase in the number and quality of original works that
the derivative right effects more than offsets any decrease in
the number of derivative works. That is possible, but there are
reasons to think that it is unlikely. The derivative right provides only one factor in the calculus of a prospective writer of
an original work, but it provides an absolute bar to creating
and commercializing unauthorized adaptations. Even in the
33. Id.
34. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
35. A recent lawsuit charged a Russian author for creating an unauthorized adaptation of Harry Potter and inserting him into a Russian cultural context, even though the book did not use the name of Potter. See ‘Russian Harry
Potter’ Courts Trouble with JK Rowling, EVENING STANDARD (London), Nov. 7,
2002, at 8, available at 2002 WLNR 3029707.
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absence of an exclusive derivative right, authors of original
works would have some ability to exploit derivative works, assuming that trademark law would prevent unauthorized
adapters from passing off their derivative works as created by
the authors of the original.36 The only reason that abolition of
the derivative right would decrease authors’ incentives to create original works is that others also would have incentives and
ability to create adaptations. It thus seems unlikely that the
derivative right encourages the creation of more works than it
discourages.37
In the absence of an empirical study refuting this logic, is
there any way to salvage the incentives justification for the derivative right? One approach might be to view the derivative
right as a backup to the reproduction right. If the copyright
holder did not hold an exclusive derivative right, then a wouldbe copier would change just enough of the original work to ensure that the copying was beyond the scope of the reproduction
right. If the reproduction right covered only literal copies and
trivial variations, this defense of the reproduction right might
seem sensible. But the reproduction right goes much further
than this, covering even the borrowing of characters and plots,
as we shall see in Part I.B. The reproduction right is thus so
36. In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. the Supreme
Court held that federal trademark law does not prevent someone from distributing an uncopyrighted work without attribution. 539 U.S. 23, 39 (2003). The
Court’s rejection of this “reverse passing off ” claim does not mean that trademark law would countenance an attempt to make an unauthorized work appear to be an authorized work by the original author, which would constitute
the more familiar act of “passing off.” See id. at 27–28 (distinguishing “reverse
passing off ” from “passing off ” under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a)(2000)).
37. I do not mean to imply that it is impossible for the eliminated incentives to be greater than the new incentives. One possible story is of secondmover advantages. See generally F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property
Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 708–09 (2001)
(explaining how second-mover advantages may provide a justification for patent protection). Imagine a world in which books are inherently money-losing
ventures, but book sales help determine which books would make profitable
movies. Books are thus in essence the first stage of investment toward development of a movie. In the absence of a derivative right, no one would want to
undertake this first stage, because if a book were successful, the producer of
the book would not be able to capture the rents from production of the movie.
In this world, the derivative right is essential to both the market for books and
thus indirectly for movies adapted from books. Similar less extreme dynamics
may well operate in real markets, but because many books are themselves
profitable, this seems insufficient by itself to provide a defense of the derivative right.
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expansive that it leaves little unprotected for the derivative
right to back up. And even if the reproduction right were narrowed, the derivative right extends considerably further than
necessary to make it economically prohibitive for pirates to
avoid liability by making modest changes to works. Moreover, if
the concern were simply to solidify the reproduction right, the
logical course would seem to be expansion of that doctrine,
rather than creation of a new one. It is legitimate to be concerned with discouraging the making of changes solely to avoid
copyright liability,38 but this concern cannot save the incentives
justification of the derivative right.
An alternative approach to saving the incentives rationale
might be to argue that although the derivative right may not
result in copyright law’s maximizing the number of works, it
provides the strongest incentives for the most important works.
Even if the incentives rationale results in the creation of only a
few more original works, some of these works may result in the
production of a large number of derivative works. The derivative right may prevent the production of many derivative
works, but these derivative works will be of less importance,
because they themselves will not likely lead to creation of many
derivative works. An original work is more likely to lead to a
derivative work than a derivative work is to lead to a secondorder derivative work. This explanation is closer to the correct
one, but ultimately it is just a reformulation of the same empirically tendentious claim. The argument equates importance
with the total number of derivative works that will flow from a
particular work, and any argument that a law constraining
production of derivative works will increase the number of derivative works at least demands some empirical support. In all
likelihood, we could obtain more derivative works by eliminating the derivative right, because then prospective creators of
derivative works rights would have a vastly greater number of
works that they could adapt without authorization, even if
there might be slightly fewer original works overall.
To solidify the argument that the derivative right can be
justified by the importance of the works that it encourages relative to those that it discourages, we must recognize that the
relative importance of a work depends not solely on whether it
will generate derivative works, but also on the extent to which
it contributes value to consumers. This anticipates the analysis
38. See infra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
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of Part II, that value to consumers depends on the extent to
which a work has close market substitutes. If most consumers
of a work alternatively would have consumed some other work
or works that provided almost as much value, then the value of
the new work is relatively low. The more redundant a copyrighted work would likely be with other works, the stronger the
case for copyright law to prevent the creation of that work by
declaring it an infringement on an existing work. In general,
derivative works will tend to be among the most redundant of
works because they borrow not the ideas, but some aspect of
the expression of the original works. Whether or not derivative
works tend to be so redundant that they reduce consumer welfare, copyright law may well maximize social welfare by incentivizing a smaller number of original works rather than a larger number of derivative works.
B. THE EXPANSIVE REPRODUCTION RIGHT
Even in the absence of the derivative right, the reproduction right may be robust enough to discourage the most blatantly redundant transformations. Perhaps the most surprising
aspect of copyright law to the uninitiated is that individual
components of works can enjoy independent copy protection
that extends far beyond literal copying. At the beginning of the
semester, students in my intellectual property law class generally believe that copyright law prevents them from copying music cassette tapes or taping television shows,39 but they are
skeptical of the possibility that copyright law might extend to
protection of characters, plots, or themes. Perhaps those might
receive protection under trademark, students who have a rudimentary sense of the distinction between copyright and
trademark might remark,40 but not under copyright. They may
back down when asked whether a minor change to a word or a
note is sufficient to escape a charge of copyright infringement,
39. It does not clearly prevent them from doing either of these things. See
Audio Home Recording Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000) (“No action may be
brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright based on . . . [a digital or analog audio recording device] or medium for making digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings.”); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,
464 U.S. 417, 454–55 (1984) (finding “time shifting” by taping programs for
later use on a Betamax not to violate fair use).
40. Indeed, there is substantial overlap between copyright and a variety of
other doctrines in these areas. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Mickey Mouse Emeritus: Character Protection and the Public Domain, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS
L. REV. 429 (1994).
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but only a bit. The savviest students, indeed, will suggest that
while the law in considering infringement may not forgive an
infringer who seeks to evade the law through minor modifications, that does not mean that an author can receive protection
for characters, plots, or themes. These intuitions, however, are
wrong. Although copyrightability will often be a close legal
question, it is at least clear that copyright protection does extend beyond direct reproduction.
Consider, for example, Anderson v. Stallone.41 The plaintiff
wrote a thirty-one page outline for a possible Rocky IV.42 Unfortunately, there was a Rocky IV,43 and even more unfortunately,
it was quite similar to the plaintiff ’s proposal, but the plaintiff
received no compensation.44 Sylvester Stallone tellingly did not
defend on the ground that the plot outlined in the plaintiff’s
treatment was uncopyrightable. Instead, Stallone slyly argued
that the outline was not entitled to copyright protection because it infringed Rocky Balboa and the other characters from
the series.45 Stallone won this fight.46 More significantly, the
strategy reflected what had long been clear, that characters are
potentially the subject of protection. Judge Learned Hand recognized this in his famous opinion in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,47 in which the principal allegation was that the
plot infringed.48 Judge Hand found no infringement, but he did
41. No. 87-0592, 1989 WL 206431 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989).
42. Id. at *1.
43. Really don’t see ROCKY IV (United Artists 1985).
44. Anderson, 1989 WL 206431, at *1–2.
45. Id. at *5–6. Copyright cannot be obtained for any part of a work using
preexisting material unlawfully. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000) (“[P]rotection for a
work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully.”). Although § 103(a) denies protection only to “any part of the work” containing unauthorized material, it is broader than a refusal to extend copyright
protection to the unauthorized material itself. A refusal of that nature would
be redundant with § 103(b), which provides that copyright in a derivative work
“does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material.” Section 103(a)
thus requires courts to determine the meaning of the word “part.”
46. Anderson, 1989 WL 206431, at *8. The critics concluded that Rocky IV
was derivative. E.g., Almar Haflidason, Film Reviews: Rocky IV, BBC, Mar.
12, 2001, http://www.bbc.co.uk/films/2000/06/11/rocky_iv_review.shtml (“[T]his
derivative and shallow sequel might weaken the credibility of the series . . . .”).
47. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
48. “The only matter common to the two,” Judge Hand summarized, “is a
quarrel between a Jewish and an Irish father, the marriage of their children,
the birth of grandchildren and a reconciliation.” Id. at 122. That was not
enough.
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conclude that both plots and characters could infringe, noting
for the latter “that the less developed the characters, the less
they can be copyrighted.”49
Protection of characters and plots is difficult to understand
on any traditional rationale. If the plot of Rocky is a good one,
why shouldn’t we allow someone else to borrow that plot in another context? If Balboa is an interesting character, then why
shouldn’t United Artists’s competitors be allowed to use the
character in their own movies? The best answer based on the
incentive theory might be that there will be less investment in
developing movies if third parties can steal the plots or characters in subsequent films. This seems specious, though, for the
same reason that incentive justifications of the derivative right
seem specious: any decrease in investment would probably at
least be offset by the increase in investment in the derivative
movies. An alternative theory might be that judges protect
characters and plots based on some intuitive sense that reusing
them amounts to misappropriation. But why does borrowing of
characters and plots trouble some jurists, when other forms of
borrowing and allusion do not?
What may be more puzzling, however, is why the Stallone
court relied on the theory that the Rocky characters are copyrighted.50 The proposed sequel was unquestionably a derivative
work, and the court indeed also justified its decision on this
ground.51 As Jed Rubenfeld recently noted, “Under present law,
the copyright owner’s ‘reproduction right’ (the exclusive right to
reproduce) is viewed as already encompassing much of what
would otherwise be covered by the ‘derivative works right’ (the
exclusive right to prepare derivative works).”52 It is not merely
that the rights are overlapping, or that those who commit the
sin of transformation cannot resist the sin of reproduction.
Rather, the tests for violation of the derivative right and violation of the reproduction right are themselves almost redundant.
When a violation of the derivative right occurs, the reproduction right is likely violated as well. Although courts sometimes

49. Id. at 121.
50. Anderson, 1989 WL 206431, at *7–8.
51. Id. at *8.
52. Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 50 (2002). Rubenfeld adds, “[I]ndeed, it has been
claimed that the derivative works right, expansive though it might seem, is
completely superfluous,” commenting that the “claim is an exaggeration, but a
surprisingly modest one.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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will return to the statutory definitions of the exclusive rights,53
“substantial similarity” has emerged as an element of the infringement inquiry for alleged violations of both the reproduction right and the derivative right.54 A violation of the derivative right will almost automatically entail a violation of the
reproduction right, because a derivative work will borrow some
aspect of the original, and that aspect will be independently
copyrightable.
In part, the similarity in definitions of the reproduction
right and the derivative right may reflect that courts often
simply do not have to distinguish them. A litigant simply does
not care whether the basis for an infringement finding is the
violation of one right or the other. There may, however, be a
deeper explanation, which is that the justification for the reproduction right and the derivative right has essentially been
the same, maximizing incentives to produce new works. Without identification of separate purposes for the two rights, the
courts have no theoretical foundation for distinguishing them.
A doctrine that distinguishes the rights more clearly would be
useful, in part because there are rare cases in which one right
but not the other is implicated. This may occur, for example,
when reproduction of a work has been authorized or is protected by fair use, but creation of a derivative work has not
been.55 More importantly, the near congruence of the definitions suggests that the current approach may be inadequate for
both rights, because it indicates that copyright doctrine has
failed to appreciate the distinctive nature of each, and therefore
an alternative definition may be needed.
C. RUBENFELD’S APPROACH
I am not the only commentator to suggest that copyright
law might distinguish more clearly between the reproduction
and derivative rights. Professor Rubenfeld has made a similar
proposal,56 although his motive could not be more different.
This Article’s project is to justify a relatively strong derivative

53. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. II 2002).
54. See, e.g., Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Int’l. Corp., 354 F.3d 112,
117 (2d Cir. 2003) (following an earlier case that the court characterized as
drawing “no distinction between the two forms of infringement,” and noting
that the “substantially similar” test applied to both forms of infringement).
55. See infra Part III.B.1.
56. Rubenfeld, supra note 52, at 50–52.
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right,57 while questioning the breadth of the reproduction right.
Rubenfeld, by contrast, is particularly concerned about the derivative right and neither endorses nor questions copyright’s
reproduction right. A consideration of Rubenfeld’s analysis will
be useful for two reasons. First, it will provide an opportunity
to consider the most prominent attack on the derivative right,
as Rubenfeld is one of few scholars to pay the derivative right
sustained attention.58 Second, it will allow for an examination
of Rubenfeld’s doctrinal proposal as a prelude to my own suggested formulation of a derivative works test.
Rubenfeld’s approach to copyright follows from a broader
theory of the First Amendment. Rubenfeld’s starting point is
his observation that the First Amendment’s protection of art59
cannot be explained by “[g]iant-sized First Amendment theories” based on some theory of either democracy or expressive
autonomy.60 Art has too small of an influence on the formation
of political opinion for democratic theories to explain it,61 and
an expressive autonomy view fails to account for the significance of the right to view art.62 Rubenfeld’s alternative is to
57. I say “relatively strong” because my approach would impose meaningful limits on the right. See infra Part III.B.1.
58. For another thoughtful critique of the derivative right, see Naomi Abe
Voegtli, Note, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213 (1997).
Voegtli argues that appropriation historically has been important in art and
other expressive activities, and that the derivative right inhibits it. Id. at
1216. Although my primary ambition is to defend the breadth of the derivative
right, I reach similar conclusions to Voegtli on some issues, such as sound
sampling. See id. at 1221–26; infra Part III.B.2.
59. E.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 602 (1998)
(“It goes without saying that artistic expression lies within this First Amendment protection.”); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group
of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (indicating that literature and arts
are “unquestionably shielded” by the First Amendment); Martin H. Redish,
The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 601–04 (1982) (discussing
First Amendment protection of art).
60. Rubenfeld, supra note 52, at 30.
61. Compare Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute,
1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 256–57 (arguing that literature and art help voters
acquire “knowledge,” “intelligence,” and “sensitivity to human values,” all of
which contribute to decisions at the ballot box), with Rubenfeld, supra note 52,
at 33 (“Suppose someone said that prayer contributes to the formation of political opinion. This statement . . . would exaggerate prayer’s political significance while instrumentalizing it, making it carry democracy’s water.”).
62. Rubenfeld recognizes that “[e]xpression requires an expressee as well
as an expresser,” but he complains that “[t]he self-expression view of art comes
to audience rights as a derivative thing, a kind of logical necessity implied secondarily if we are going to give artists the freedom to which they are entitled.”
Rubenfeld, supra note 52, at 34.
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propose that the First Amendment protects a “freedom of
imagination,”63 which includes “the freedom to explore the
world not present, creatively and communicatively.”64 This
reconceptualization, Rubenfeld argues, both explains the protection of art and reflects the foundational point “that state actors cannot jail a person for holding the wrong political opinion
or for believing in the wrong god.”65
Rubenfeld’s endorsement of the freedom of imagination,
however, is subject to the same criticism that he levied at expressive autonomy theories,66 that the freedom is one of the author rather than of the consumer of expressive works. Perhaps
anticipating this, Rubenfeld insists that the communication of
imagination is central to the freedom of imagination,67 but he
does not explain why we should accept this view while rejecting
the views of those who insist that the right to have a listener is
essential to expressive autonomy. I make this criticism not to
attack Rubenfeld’s constitutional theory, which is beyond my
scope here, but to identify the fundamental difficulty in applying it. The question is to what extent the law must protect
communication of imagination to honor the broader First
Amendment freedom. Rubenfeld’s answer is that “[i]f the alleged harms that the state seeks to redress by prohibiting or
prosecuting the conduct in question can be fully, persuasively
explained without any reference to anything the person communicated through that conduct, then the person is not punished for speaking.”68 A “creative murderer” thus cannot escape
prosecution, because “to prosecute him is not to punish him for
what he dared to imagine.”69
This explanation, however, cannot adequately distinguish
the reproduction right from the derivative right, because if the
reproduction right is not to be easily evaded, the courts must
consider the content of allegedly infringing works that are not
identical to the originals. “[N]ot just any change in the original
work should suffice to evade the copyright holder’s reproduc-

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 37–43.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 33–35.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 41.
Id. at 42.
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tion right,” Rubenfeld acknowledges.70 “Trivial or obvious modifications, or changes that involve no substantially new act of
imagination, especially if introduced to evade the reproduction
right, should not qualify.”71 This threshold, however, is so low
that courts either would have to inquire into motive72 or allow
works with only relatively modest injections of originality to
qualify as derivative works. Rubenfeld takes the latter approach, recommending that copyright import into the definition
of derivative works the separate case law concerning when a
derivative work is sufficiently original to qualify for its own
copyright.73 “The required quantum of creativity is not large,”
Rubenfeld notes, adding that “any ‘substantial’ or ‘distinguishable variation’ from the preexisting work will be sufficient.”74
This test, however, cannot be squared with Rubenfeld’s
concern about “trivial or obvious modifications” if triviality is to
be measured against the work as a whole.75 Consider, for example, a version of Gone with the Wind in which a paragraph
or a chapter was replaced with an alternative. Such a change
surely would involve an act of imagination, and a paragraph or
chapter can be sufficiently long to merit independent copyright
protection, yet it seems inconceivable that copyright law would
or should tolerate distribution of such a work.76 Under
Rubenfeld’s approach, even very minor substantive changes, as
long as they are not “trivial,” would entitle a work to derivative
status, and thus under his proposal, to exemption from the reproduction right.77 This is an absolutist position, an insistence

70. Id. at 55.
71. Id.
72. In other writing, Rubenfeld has shown sympathy for judicial consideration of motives. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J.
427, 452–54 (1997) (justifying the school desegregation cases on the ground
that the purpose, and not merely the effect, of the statutes was to degrade
black people).
73. Rubenfeld, supra note 52, at 53–55. This standard is usually viewed
as quite low. See infra Part III.C.
74. Rubenfeld, supra note 52, at 55 (citing cases allowing relatively small
variations to be sufficient, including Matthew Bender & Co. v. W. Publ’g Co.,
158 F.3d 674, 680 (2d Cir. 1998); and Norma Ribbon & Trimming, Inc. v. Little, 51 F.3d 45, 47 (5th Cir. 1995)).
75. Id.
76. One could imagine a copyright law that would tolerate distribution of
the new portions alone, along with indications of what text they should replace. But Rubenfeld wisely does not suggest this caveat and thus appears to
envision incorporation of expression into transformative works.
77. Rubenfeld, supra note 52, at 55.
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that copyright law cannot block the use of a large amount of
previous authors’ expression to support a relatively modest exercise of imagination.
This criticism might seem a picky quibble about where to
draw the constitutional line, but the objection is not a minor
one, for if Rubenfeld does not take his absolutist position, he
can offer no conclusive attack on the current state of the derivative right. Once we accept that it is sometimes proper to
limit use of preexisting expression, then we need some rule determining just how much of previous authors’ expression can be
copied in works that independently display imagination. Copyright law draws such a line, allowing authors to use without
authorization the ideas but not the expression of their predecessors.78 Perhaps this is not the best line. Admittedly, it is notoriously imprecise.79 But creating a more precise test, or a
narrower but still not absolutist test, would require considerable effort. Moreover, the idea-expression dichotomy does pay
some attention to the freedom of imagination. It allows anyone
to exercise imagination as long as she does so without using
others’ expression. No unauthorized party can distribute books
containing alternative endings to Gone with the Wind,80 but an
author could express the same underlying ideas using different
sets of characters. In addition, an author would remain free to
criticize the original either directly or in a parody meeting the
requirements of the fair use test.81
78. See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the
Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work’s “Total Concept and
Feel,” 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 395–96 (1989) (noting that courts have found the
idea/expression dichotomy to justify copyright law under the First Amendment, but questioning whether the distinction is adequate to ensure copyright’s constitutionality).
79. As Judge Hand noted in developing the abstractions test for distinguishing ideas from expression, “[n]obody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.” Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119,
121 (2d Cir. 1930).
80. See Sun Trust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357,
1384 (N.D. Ga. 2001), vacated, 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam),
order vacated and opinion substituted, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (“When
the reader of Gone with the Wind turns over the last page, he may well wonder
what becomes of Ms. Mitchell’s beloved characters and their romantic, but
tragic, world. . . . The right to answer those questions . . . legally belongs to
Ms. Mitchell’s heirs . . . .”), quoted in Rubenfeld, supra note 52, at 54.
81. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994)
(holding that parody may be protected as fair use). Rubenfeld argues that fair
use cannot save the derivative right: “No court in the United States should
need to wrestle through a set of complicated statutory factors (the factors of
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In the end, I cannot say whether the First Amendment
concern with the freedom of imagination is so weighty as to
render the existing regime inadequate. How to weigh the freedom of imagination with the Constitution’s encouragement of
copyright depends on historical, value-laden, and empirical concerns. Rubenfeld suggests that economic factors should necessarily yield to constitutional concerns. Although economic interests and speech interests often may be aligned, because
speech has economic value, Rubenfeld observes that the First
Amendment would and should strike down a ban on speech,
even if that ban were thought likely to maximize the amount of
speech produced overall.82
Absolutism, however, is not the prevailing approach in
First Amendment jurisprudence,83 and given the Constitution’s
grant of the copyright power, economic concerns seem at least
tangentially relevant to the constitutional analysis. Perhaps
anticipating this, Rubenfeld suggests an administrative scheme
that he seems to believe would allow the freedom of imagination to exist without undue economic repercussions. Rather
than allow free licenses to create derivative works, Rubenfeld
suggests that a copyright holder “would have an action for
profit allocation.”84 Though Rubenfeld does not explain just
the fair use defense) before deciding whether to suppress a book like The Wind
Done Gone. We don’t suppress books in this country.” Rubenfeld, supra note
52, at 54. Rubenfeld, however, does not justify the premise that the complexity
of copyright law itself constitutes a First Amendment violation. If copyright
law creates a satisfactory line between permitted and prohibited uses of others’ expression, it should not matter that this line arises from the interaction
of doctrine concerning the idea-expression dichotomy with the fair use test.
Rubenfeld may believe that the parody exception may not be broad enough, a
concern that I share. But if that is so, his criticism should be directed at fair
use, not at the derivative right.
82. Rubenfeld invokes a slippery slope argument against the position that
the First Amendment should seek to maximize the amount of speech:
Perhaps offensive speech and copyright infringement really do have a
“silencing” effect, ultimately producing less speech overall. Come to
think of it, perhaps a knockdown argument is also silencing . . . . Are
we to understand that a person can be jailed for making too good an
argument against copyright law, an argument so good it brings debate to an end, leaving its audience with little or nothing to say?
Rubenfeld, supra note 52, at 22–23 (emphasis omitted).
83. See, e.g., Solveig Singleton, Reviving a First Amendment Absolutism
for the Internet, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 279, 280 (1999) (“[T]he First Amendment doctrine associated with Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Hugo
Black known as ‘First Amendment absolutism’ is presently unfashionable.”
(footnotes omitted)).
84. Rubenfeld, supra note 52, at 55 (emphasis omitted).
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how profits would be allocated,85 he argues that such an action
leaves “the author [of a derivative work] no worse off than he
would have been had he chosen not to commercialize the derivative work.”86 Such an author, after all, could choose to “offer[] the work for free.”87
Rubenfeld is presumably correct that derivative work authors would be no worse off under his approach than under the
current regime, but authors who might make derivative works
of their own may be considerably worse off. Ordinarily, such
authors will be willing to sell the right to create derivative
works at some price, and so Rubenfeld’s regime will make a difference only when the profit allocation adjudication can be expected to allow use at some lower price. Rubenfeld purports to
offer no policy defense of the profit allocation scheme,88 but his
approach effectively strikes a compromise between the current
derivative right and a regime with no derivative right at all,
and the degree of compromise would depend on the mechanisms of the profit allocation approach.89 Even if we assume
that there is some feasible way of apportioning profits based on
the degree of contribution, we must still ask whether social welfare would be increased by decreasing an author’s control over
the creation of adaptations, resulting in copyright races and a
85. As Rubenfeld recognizes, “Apportioning profits in such cases would
not be an obvious proposition; the share of profits owing to the original author
might be very considerable.” Id. at 58.
86. Id. at 57.
87. Id. Allowing authors to exercise their imagination but not commercialize the results (in the sense of themselves profiting from the expression resulting from the imagination) would be one means of vindicating the freedom of
imagination without abolishing the derivative right. A profit allocation suit
would not be necessary; copyright law could simply provide that the author of
an unauthorized derivative work is not liable for damages, but forfeits the reproduction right for that work. Even with such an approach, however, copyright law would need to ensure that the derivative works do not violate the
original work’s reproduction right, properly, but not trivially conceived.
88. Id. at 58–59 (“I make no claim about whether this result would be
good or bad policy. The result is not supposed to follow from policy considerations. It is supposed to follow from constitutional considerations . . . . [C]opyrights act as prior restraints.”).
89. It is thus possible that the profit allocation approach might demand so
much in payment that it would make no difference at all. A liability rule can
function like a property rule if liability for taking property is sufficiently high.
See David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1, 13–17 (1990) (offering a model in
which supercompensatory damages define the difference between a property
rule and a liability rule). If payments are trivial, on the other hand, then the
profit allocation approach amounts to elimination of the derivative right.
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greater number of derivative works being created. The answer
is empirical, but the next part explains why elimination of the
derivative right might reduce social welfare.
II. A RENT DISSIPATION THEORY OF
THE DERIVATIVE RIGHT
Although the economics of product differentiation are complex, there is a simple underlying idea that is relevant to a consideration of redundancy of copyrighted works, that of demand
diversion or business stealing. Part II.A will review the recent
literature noting the existence of this possibility and describing
the countervailing forces that act against overentry. Part II.B
describes an alternative theoretical framework for understanding copyright redundancy, and that is the phenomenon of rentdissipating races by private parties. Not only does this framework provide an intuitive basis for applying the core theoretical
insight of the copyright-and-product-differentiation literature,
but it also emphasizes two key theoretical points: first, that
product space may be more crowded in some areas than others;
second, competing authors of derivative works might aim for
roughly the same spot in product space at the same time, producing inefficiencies associated with racing. After reviewing the
literature on rent dissipation in other areas of law, this Part
will imagine a hypothetical copyright regime with a stronger
derivative right. This hypothetical regime would limit rent dissipation, but it would introduce other problems and concerns,
particularly about freedom of speech. Finally, Part II.C will use
the rent dissipation approach to offer a renewed assessment of
the derivative right, the reproduction right, and the copyright
term.
A. PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION THEORY
In models of competitive markets, goods are often assumed
to be homogeneous.90 This model is effective for commodities
like wheat, and for many products sold monopolistically, such
as electricity, but many consumer products are differentiated.
Restaurants all serve food, but they may serve different types
of food, with appropriate or inappropriate decor, and varying
levels of quality and service. And while books all share some-

90. See, e.g., GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 87–88 (3d ed.
1966) (defining perfect competition).
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thing in common, they describe different subjects and tell their
stories in different ways. Markets for books and other copyrighted works, like markets for restaurants, are thus markets
for differentiated products. Economists analyze such markets
with a framework called imperfect competition,91 relaxing
(among other assumptions) the assumption of perfect competition models that competing goods are homogeneous. This imperfect competition framework has spawned a literature on
product differentiation that considers, among other questions,
the welfare effects of producer entry into imperfectly competitive markets.92
Although the literature on product differentiation was well
developed by the end of the twentieth century, it received no attention in the copyright literature until recently. In 2001, Michael Meurer noted the possibility of production of redundant
copyrighted works in a brief discussion in an article on price
discrimination in markets for copyrighted works.93 “[M]ultiple
producers,” Meurer observed, “sometimes race to get to the
market first with essentially duplicative works.”94 Excessive
entry into a market is particularly dangerous “when there are
close substitutes for a new . . . [p]roduct in a market niche already crowded with other similar products.”95 The possibility of
excessive production of copyrighted works was relevant for
Meurer’s project because Meurer was evaluating an argument
that price discrimination by copyright owners is welfare increasing, allowing copyright owners to obtain greater profits
and thus inducing them to produce more works. As Meurer correctly observed, we cannot assume that more is necessarily

91. For a significant early article, see, Edward H. Chamberlin, Monopolistic or Imperfect Competition?, 51 Q.J. ECON. 557, 566 (1937). For an overview,
see generally JAN KEPPLER, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION THEORY: ORIGINS,
RESULTS, AND IMPLICATIONS (1994).
92. For some extended treatments, see generally SIMON P. ANDERSON ET
AL., DISCRETE CHOICE THEORY OF PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION (1992); JOHN
BEATH & YANNIS KATSOULACOS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION (1991); and 1–2 THE ECONOMICS OF PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION (Jacques Francois Thisse & George Norman eds., 1994).
93. Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 96–97 (2001). For an article that touches on the possibility
that there might be an excessive number of content producers, though not
necessarily an excessive amount of content, see C. Edwin Baker, Giving the
Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 339–40 (1997).
94. Meurer, supra note 93, at 97.
95. Id.
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merrier in markets for copyrighted works, and therefore it is
not clear whether doctrine encouraging price discrimination
raises social welfare by increasing incentives to produce new
works.96
Though made to evaluate copyright’s treatment of price
discrimination, Meurer’s point about the value of incentives has
broader resonance, potentially applying to any copyright issue
that might affect incentives to produce copyrighted works, and
possibly to areas besides copyright. Indeed, in a 2002 article,
Richard Markovits argued that a range of governmental policies might produce excessive research expenditures.97 Markovits distinguished two types of such expenditure: productionprocess research, designed to decrease the cost of producing
goods, and quality-and-variety investments, designed to increase the quality and variety of products.98 Markovits argued
that we may have too little of the former and too much of the
latter.99 Although Markovits’s analysis took into account some
factors not explicitly considered by Meurer, such as the effects
of monopoly distortions, the central insight was similar, that
marginal investments in improving product quality and variety
withdraw resources from other projects.100 If the social benefits
of the improvements are small, then the social costs of such research may exceed the benefits. Markovits concluded his discussion with a two-page analysis of intellectual property law,
noting the possibility that “broadening . . . copyright protection
will increase misallocation by increasing the allocative excessiveness of the investments we make in the relevant types of
. . . artistic creation.”101
To see concretely how copyright law might produce excessive entry incentives, consider the following example. Suppose
that you are the author of the world’s only vegetarian cookbook,
and if no one enters the market, your future profits, in expected
value terms, will be $100,000. Let us suppose that I am considering writing another cookbook, different enough for purposes

96. Id.
97. Richard S. Markovits, On the Economic Efficiency of Using Law to Increase Research and Development: A Critique of Various Tax, Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and Tort Law Rules and Policy Proposals, 39 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 63, 67–69 (2002).
98. Id. at 68–69.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 80.
101. Id. at 118.
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of copyright law, but similar enough so that no consumer would
ever care to buy both cookbooks, and so that all consumers essentially would be indifferent between the two. If I expect that
my entry will not affect the price of cookbooks, then I would be
willing to spend up to $50,000 (including the opportunity cost of
my time) to take away half of your market and half of the expected profits. From a social perspective, my $50,000 investment is wasteful, with no consumer benefiting and another
producer $50,000 worse off, a loss that the literature refers to
as “demand diversion” or “business stealing.”102 Society would
be better off if I had put this investment to alternative uses, for
example by becoming a cook instead of a cookbook writer.
This is a stylized example, because in real markets, there
are more works in any given subgenre and each work is sufficiently different from every other such that no two works are
perfect substitutes. There are, however, more elaborate models
that can produce the same result. Steven Salop, for example,
created a model in which different firms located around a circle.103 The circle represented the geographical space analogue
of product space, and Salop’s model recognized that larger
numbers of firms would reduce both prices and the “transport
costs” that consumers bear when there is no product that exactly matches what they want.104 Under fairly general assumptions,105 Salop showed that twice as many firms enter the market as is socially optimal because each entrant does not take
into account that entry will harm rivals.106 Salop’s analysis,
however, provided just one way of modeling product diversity,
and in other models, overentry is less likely to occur.107

102. See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, Free Entry and
Social Inefficiency, 17 RAND. J. ECON. 48, 49 (1986).
103. Steven C. Salop, Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods, 10
BELL J. ECON. 141, 143–44 (1979).
104. See id. at 144.
105. Though Salop’s assumptions given the circular model are general,
Salop acknowledged that the circular model itself may not be robust to alternative specifications. Id. at 156.
106. See id. at 152.
107. See, e.g., Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297, 299–300 (1977).
For a critique of the Dixit-Stiglitz approach, see John S. Pettengill, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity: Comment, 69 AM. ECON. REV.
957 (1979), and for a response to the critique, see Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph
E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity: Reply,
69 AM. ECON. REV. 961 (1979).
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Recognizing this complexity, in An Industrial Organization
Approach to Copyright Law, I established an analytical foundation for the present project by explaining product differentiation theory’s relevance for copyright law’s incentives-access
paradigm,108 the oft-noted trade-off between increasing incentives to produce new works and access to existing works.109 If
there is excessive production of copyrighted works, then there
is no trade-off from a social welfare perspective. My intent,
however, was not to suggest that there indeed was excessive
production, but rather to note that even if production incentives
are the paramount goal of copyright law, such incentives are
less important at the margin and that policies producing slight
decreases in the number of works produced might nonetheless
be welfare increasing. The article includes a simulation model
suggesting that markets for copyrighted works might have excessive or inadequate investment, but that either way, under
certain conditions increasing access to copyrighted works by allowing greater noncommercial copying could increase social
welfare.110 The analysis thus strengthens the case for placing
considerable weight in the policy calculus on access to existing
copyrighted works, for example making legalization of peer-topeer file-sharing seem more attractive than it otherwise might
appear.111
Reinforcing the observation that product space can be
crowded, Christopher Yoo apparently observed the connection
between copyright and product differentiation at about the
same time as I did, and indeed he won the “copyright race” by
publishing his article first.112 Yoo’s thesis is that the product
differentiation literature helps to explain several puzzles arising from theories treating copyrighted works as public goods,
which imply that copyrighted works should sell at constant
marginal cost and that markets for copyrighted works should
exhibit natural monopoly properties.113 Yoo also notes that demand diversion could lead to production of an excessive number
of copyrighted works, but, like me, he recognizes that such a
108. See Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization Approach to
Copyright Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33 (2004).
109. See generally Lunney, supra note 11 (discussing the trade-off).
110. See Abramowicz, supra note 108, at app.
111. See id. at 97–103.
112. See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 212 (2004).
113. Id. at 231–34, 246–51.
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result is not inevitable.114 Both Yoo’s analysis and my previous
analysis recognize that copyrighted works may be substitutes
for one another and thus imply that copyright redundancy may
have benefits and costs for consumers.115
The product differentiation literature ultimately can serve
as only a preliminary model of copyright markets, however, for
at least two reasons. First, the literature fails to take into account the variable density of product space. The product differentiation approach is difficult to apply to concrete doctrinal
problems because every copyrighted work faces a different set
of substitutes, and even identifying that set of substitutes
proves to be a complicated problem.116 Even if we have too few
works overall, and indeed even if we have the optimal number
or too few derivative works, it remains possible that if we
eliminated the derivative right, we would have too many. We
therefore must consider not copyright markets as a whole, but
specifically the competition that would exist in the absence of
the derivative right between the original author and the authors of unauthorized derivatives, as well as among the authors
of unauthorized derivatives. Rent dissipation theory will provide an approach that allows more direct focus on such competition, in an analytically more tractable framework.
Second, the product differentiation literature fails to take
into account the dynamics of the process through which prospective copyright owners situate their works in product space.
Salop’s model assumes that different producers simultaneously
situate themselves, evenly spaced, in product space.117 Other
models allow for sequential positioning in product space,118 but
this too is unrealistic. In the absence of the derivative right, rival exploiters of a single work would not queue up, each waiting for the last to finish work before proceeding. To the contrary, rivals might well seek to aim for approximately the same
point in product space, and because being first matters in copy114. Id. at 260–64.
115. See id. at 271–72; supra note 108, at 37.
116. See generally Shubha Ghosh, Rights of First Entry in “Derivative
Markets”: Exploring Market Definition in Copyright (Aug. 8, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (considering the implication of the
product differentiation literature for derivative works).
117. Salop, supra note 103, at 144.
118. See, e.g., Jonathan Eaton & Henryk Kierzkowski, Oligopolistic Competition, Product Variety, Entry Deterrence, and Technology Transfer, 15 RAND J.
ECON. 99, 99 (1984) (offering a model in which entry by one producer may deter entry by others).
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right markets, the rivals might make decisions about how
much time to invest in improving their copyrighted works
based in part on their anticipation of rivals’ progress. Rent dissipation theory has previously shed light on the welfare implications of patent races,119 and it can do the same for copyright
races.
B. RENT DISSIPATION THEORY
1. An Introduction to Rent Dissipation
Economic rents are “returns in excess of the opportunity
cost” of specific resources, and quasi rents are “returns in excess of the short-run opportunity cost” of resources.120 To the
extent that a copyright owner earns a profit that will vanish
once competitors enter the relevant market by creating substitute works, the profit is a quasi rent. Because entrants are
seeking a portion of existing rents, the activities they undertake to enter the market are called “rent seeking,” and the tendency of entry costs to reduce rents is called “rent dissipation.”121 Rent-seeking activity is not inherently inefficient. All
those who create works for profit are rent seeking, but their activity may nonetheless increase social welfare, as new creative
works increase consumer surplus. The rent dissipation literature makes clear, however, that rent-seeking activity can reduce social welfare.122 In the copyright context, this is particularly likely whenever many new entrants are close substitutes
for one another, as would be the case in the absence of the derivative right.
The most familiar example of rent seeking in the legal and
public-choice literatures is the lobbying of public officials to secure a private monopoly,123 a source of inefficiency that may
even exceed the deadweight loss associated with monopoly pric-

119. See infra Part II.B.2.
120. E.g., Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate
Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 323 n.2 (1986).
121. For an excellent discussion of rent seeking and rent dissipation, see
Aditya Bamzai, Comment, The Wasteful Duplication Thesis in Natural Monopoly Regulation, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1525, 1534–40 (2004).
122. The seminal works identifying the potential welfare-reducing consequences of rent seeking are Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the
Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291 (1974), and Gordon Tullock, The
Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967).
123. See, e.g., Krueger, supra note 122, at 292–93.
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ing.124 Any investment by a private party to capture rents, protect rents, or take rents enjoyed by another party can constitute
rent seeking, however.125 An example not involving lobbying is
that of the gold rush.126 Suppose that I have found a gold mine
worth $100,000, but because of an absence of property rights,
anyone who is willing to pay $1000 for equipment can get an
equal share of the mine’s gold at no further cost. Then, 100
people will enter, for a total fixed cost of $100,000. Society is
thus no better off than if the gold mine had never been found,
as the rents that I would have earned if I were able to remove
all the gold myself are dissipated away. A similar example is
that of a valuable shipwreck.127 When anyone can salvage the
ship, the societal investments to find it will approach the value
of the ship. If the social investments equal the value, even if
the party to reach the ship is allowed to keep it in its entirety,
society as a whole is no better off than if the treasure had never
even existed.128
Competition, however, may not entirely dissipate a rent,
for several reasons. First, if some of the participants are risk
averse, as behavioral economics would predict at least when
individuals are racing to capture a gain rather than avoid a
loss,129 then the total investment in the search will be less than
the prize.130 Second, because rent dissipation reflects in part
124. See Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation,
83 J. POL. ECON. 807, 807 (1975).
125. A related expense is rent defending, where individuals seek to prevent
the rent-seeking activities of others. See, e.g., John T. Wenders, On Perfect
Rent Dissipation, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 456, 456–58 (1987).
126. For a study of how emerging property rights helped prevent rent dissipation during the California gold rush, see John Umbeck, The California
Gold Rush: A Study of Emerging Property Rights, 14 EXPLORATIONS ECON.
HIST. 197 (1977). For an explanation of how rent dissipation may occur with
any nonexclusive resource, see Steven N.S. Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. & ECON. 49, 58–64
(1970).
127. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 41 (5th ed. 1998).
128. See id.
129. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames,
in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 1, 20–22 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000) (summarizing experimental evidence indicating that individuals are generally risk averse as to gains and risk seeking as to losses); Chris
Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 163, 176–81 (2000) (explaining that prospect theory in the litigation context shows that choices between gains induces risk aversion, and choices between losses encourages risk seeking).
130. See generally Arye L. Hillman & Eliakim Katz, Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power, 94 ECON. J. 104 (1984) (offering a
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opportunity costs, a rent will be entirely dissipated only if each
participant is indifferent between participating in the activity
and in some other activity.131 Third, if the parties are not identically situated, rent dissipation may be reduced or eliminated.132 To take an extreme example, if it is apparent that, regardless of the efforts of others, one party will definitely arrive
first and capture all of the gold, then no one else will enter the
race.133 Fourth, rent-dissipating races can lead to earlier
achievement of a goal, resulting in an end to rent-dissipating
activities.134 Fifth, rent dissipation may produce third-party
benefits. Those participating in the California Gold Rush may
have provided positive externalities to other settlers of California, and treasure hunts may result in benefits to archaeologists.135
These caveats suggest that in real-world settings, rent dissipation will be incomplete. Perhaps the most significant factor
reducing rent dissipation, however, is property rights. If, for
example, the law specifies that a unique party has the rights to
a sunken vessel,136 then no one else will enter, thus entirely
avoiding the rent-dissipating race. The owner of the vessel then
careful analysis on the effect of risk aversion on rent dissipation).
131. Id. at 104 (“[B]ecause of intrinsic second-best considerations[,] resources used in rent seeking may not have positive shadow prices, implying
that individuals’ quests to secure biddable rents need not always entail socially wasteful activity.”).
132. See, e.g., Christopher Harris & John Vickers, Perfect Equilibrium in a
Model of a Race, 52 REV. ECON. STUD. 193, 294–295 (1985); Wing Suen, Rationing and Rent Dissipation in the Presence of Heterogeneous Individuals, 97
J. POL. ECON. 1384 (1989). Full analysis of the dynamics of rent-dissipating
races where the parties are not identically situated requires game theory. See,
e.g., Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the
Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization, 77 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS &
PROC.) 176 (1987) (providing a game-theoretic approach to rent dissipation
analysis).
133. For a game-theoretic analysis underscoring the possibility of incomplete rent seeking, see Gordon Tullock, Efficient Rent Seeking, in TOWARD A
THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 97 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds.,
1980).
134. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 127, at 41 (noting that entry by multiple
parties to find a shipwreck might lead to the wreck being found earlier).
135. Archaeologists, however, argue that treasure hunters have generally
caused archaeological damage. See, e.g., Christopher R. Bryant, The Archaeological Duty of Care: The Legal, Professional, and Cultural Struggle over Salvaging Historic Shipwrecks, 65 ALB. L. REV. 97, 110–11 (2001).
136. The law attempts to do this. See Abandoned Shipwreck Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 2101–2106 (2000) (granting title of applicable shipwrecks to the United
States).
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has an incentive to raise the vessel when the benefits of doing
so are greater than the costs. The owner, for example, may wait
if technology for the task is expected to improve or become
cheaper to overcome considerations of the time value of money.
Similarly, consider the example of public fisheries.137 The existence of rent dissipation in the absence of property rights is
particularly apparent here, as competition may lead to overfishing and the destruction of the fishery. The problem, however, is broader than overfishing. If the government, for example, permitted fishing each year until a sustainable 1000 fish
were harvested, an inefficiently high number of fishermen
would still enter the market, dissipating the value of each harvest. But if the right to the 1000 fish were granted to a single
fisherman, perhaps through an auction, then the fisherman’s
private incentive would be to maximize the value of this rent by
minimizing the cost of seeking the 1000 fish. Similarly, if the
entire fishery were sold, then the owner would have both static
and dynamic incentives to engage in the optimal amount of
fishing. That is, the owner will have appropriate incentives to
choose the number of fish to extract in a year and to select a
technology, and thus a speed, at which those fish will be extracted in a particular year.
2. Rent Dissipation in Patent Law
Although rent dissipation has received little attention in
copyright law, the potential of property rights to reduce rent
dissipation animates Edmund Kitch’s prospecting theory of
patent law.138 Research into potential innovations can be a
form of rent dissipation.139 If there were a million dollars in potential profit to be made in developing an invention, for example, by marketing and improving the light bulb, then in the absence of patent protection, producers would dissipate away this
potential profit. Such rent dissipation is less obvious than the
rent dissipation of the gold rush, because the competition is
likely to increase consumer welfare, but it is possible that the
costs of such rent dissipation may exceed the benefits.140
137. See, e.g., H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a CommonProperty Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954) (discussing the
absence of rents in the fishing industry).
138. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20
J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977).
139. See id. at 276–77.
140. Rent dissipation theory is thus insufficient to make a priori welfare
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Kitch’s observation is that patent law does for innovation
policy what a prospecting system does for a gold rush,141 providing property rights that reduce the possibility of rent dissipation. In the absence of property rights in the gold context, no
one has an incentive to prospect for gold, unless a discovery can
at least temporarily be kept secret, because others will immediately converge to share in any reward. Just as a property
right solves this problem, so too does patent law provide an incentive to generate innovation despite the possibility of secondmover advantages.142 That point is a twist on the traditional
incentive rationale for patent law,143 but Kitch also emphasized
that a patent improves postinvention incentives,144 because
there is no risk of a rent-dissipating race to improve a patented
product. In the absence of patent protection, such a race might
result in excessive, partly redundant research. More inventors
may pursue a particular line of research than is socially optimal.145
Patents, however, cannot eliminate rent dissipation altogether, as Donald McFetridge and Douglas Smith pointed out
shortly after Kitch.146 Rather, patent protection pushes rentdissipating entry to an earlier stage. Instead of competing to
improve and market an existing innovation, private parties in a
patent regime will compete to obtain the patent.147 The result is
assessments, a task which industrial organization attempts. See Abramowicz,
supra note 108, at 110–11 (noting the need for careful empirical analysis of
markets for copyrighted works). For a further discussion of the rent dissipation problem in patent law, see Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes,
56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 181–93 (2003).
141. Kitch, supra note 138, at 271–75.
142. First-mover advantages may give some incentive to innovate even absent patent protection. See, e.g., Cecelia A. Conrad, The Advantage of Being
First and Competition Between Firms, 1 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 353, 363 (1983);
Paul Klemperer, Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching Costs,
97 ECON. J. 99, 115–16 (Supp. 1987); Richard Schmalensee, Product Differentiation Advantages of Pioneering Brands, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 360–61
(1982).
143. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 497 n.2 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he basic economic function of the patent system
is to encourage the making and commercialization of inventions . . . .”).
144. Kitch, supra note 138, at 285–86.
145. See JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION 259–60 (Mark Perlman ed., 1992).
146. Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and
Economic Surplus: A Comment, 23 J.L. & ECON. 197, 198 (1980).
147. Patents do not, however, eliminate postpatent rent-dissipating races,
because inventors may still seek to invent around existing patents. The courts
have embraced inventing around as an important benefit of the patent system.
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a patent race. That patent races are examples of rent dissipation may seem counterintuitive, because scientific races,
whether or not for patents, often accelerate the pace of innovation.148 Yet, patent races can also produce redundancy, especially if different competitors run down the same blind alleys,
unaware of their competitors’ successes and failures.149 Thus,
patent races are a useful example of rent dissipation that has
some benefit for third parties, consumers who eventually will
receive surplus from the invention.150 The ultimate cost-benefit
balance is theoretically indeterminate, and presumably varies
from one patent race to the next. Even more theoretically com-

See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1520
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that inventing around is “one of the important public
benefits that justify awarding the patent owner exclusive rights to his invention”); State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235–36 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (arguing that inventing around “bring[s] a steady flow of innovations to the marketplace”). Yet inventing around can be redundant too, especially if the new invention offers no advantage over the previous one. See, e.g.,
Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1813, 1869 (1984); Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive
Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 455 (1969). A recent analysis suggests that “between-patent” competition, i.e., competition from others with similar products,
may cost an innovator as much as “within-patent” competition, i.e., competition from generic products after a patent expires. See Frank R. Lichtenberg &
Tomas J. Philipson, The Dual Effects of Intellectual Property Regulations:
Within and Between Patent Competition in the US Pharmaceutical Industry
(Harris Sch. of Pub. Pol’y, Working Paper No. 02.09, 2002).
148. Competition in sequencing the human genome provides a recent example. See Eliot Marshall, Rival Genome Sequencers Celebrate a Milestone Together, 288 SCIENCE 2294, 2294 (2000) (reporting on the early completion of an
initial sequence). For an argument that patent races often accelerate innovation and lead to inventions entering the public domain earlier than they otherwise would, see John F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71
U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 443–44 (2004).
149. While patent races may accelerate the point at which a patent is
awarded, they also can delay that period. Participants in a patent race may
reveal enough information to prevent their competitors from obtaining a patent first, in effect moving the end point of the race farther away. See, e.g.,
Douglas Lichtman et al., Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System, 53 VAND.
L. REV. 2175, 2197–99 (2000) (providing a model of the incentive to engage in
strategic disclosure); Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 926 (2000) (discussing the possibility of strategic disclosure). Such strategic disclosure can enhance efficiency, by limiting the scope of patents and
thus reducing deadweight costs, but also may decrease the incentives to obtain
patents in the first place. See id. at 944–45.
150. Robert Merges and Richard Nelson argued that Kitch understated the
value of competition among researchers. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R.
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839,
872 (1990).
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plex is a comparison of the harm from pre-patent and postinvention rent dissipation. Though an important qualification,
the McFetridge-Smith analysis thus does not entirely undermine Kitch’s suggestion that patent law’s concentration of
prospecting rights promotes efficiency.151
Mark Grady and Jay Alexander extended Kitch’s analysis
while acknowledging this point by arguing that patent law
seeks to provide a balance between the inefficiencies of patent
races and the competitive development of existing innovations.152 “Sometimes the threat of improvement-stage rent dissipation calls for broad protection; sometimes no such threat
exists, making patent protection less important,” argued Grady
and Alexander,153 who were the first to elaborate a connection
between the patent and rent dissipation literatures.154 Patent
law grants broad protection when an “invention signals a set of
improvements,” and patents in such cases preclude “any possibility of a rent-dissipating rush to discover the modifications.”155 Patent law limits protection where patent races present the greater rent dissipation danger. For example, Grady
and Alexander suggested that patent law’s utility requirement156 precludes patenting of compounds that have no known
use because “a rule allowing chemicals to be patented before a
use could be demonstrated would prompt a race to claim as
many chemicals as possible, in the hope that some would prove
useful during the patent term.”157

151. Another argument in favor of prospect theory is that there may be another means of reducing rent dissipation that is not socially inefficient. In particular, patent races reduce the effective patent term, resulting in a transfer
from inventors to society. See Duffy, supra note 148, at 444.
152. Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation,
78 VA. L. REV. 305, 317 (1992) (“[A] full accounting of the effects of the patent
system must balance the savings in reduced follow-on investment against the
losses from accelerated pioneering investment. It may be that the avoidance of
follow-on rent dissipation more than makes up for the consequences of the
race to be first.”). This account thus balances the costs of both types of rent
dissipation. A broader theory might also consider the benefits, such as the extent to which competition is likely to increase the amount of innovation.
153. Id. at 318.
154. Kevin Rhodes briefly made such a connection before Grady and Alexander. See Kevin Rhodes, Comment, The Federal Circuit’s Patent Nonobviousness Standards: Theoretical Perspectives on Recent Doctrinal Changes, 85 NW.
U. L. REV. 1051, 1088 (1991).
155. Grady & Alexander, supra note 152, at 318.
156. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
157. Grady & Alexander, supra note 152, at 339.
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Regardless of whether Grady and Alexander’s rent dissipation theory of patent law accurately captures both doctrine and
actual judicial decision making,158 their approach recognizes
the possibility of excessive and redundant innovative activity at
both the patenting and the improvement stages. The rent dissipation literature, however, is important not only because it
focuses attention on the amount of innovative activity, but also
on the possibility that competition may force deployment, either of an original invention or of follow-on inventions, at an
earlier than optimal time. Because inventors want to obtain
market share, they may commercialize inventions before it
would be socially efficient for them to do so. Patent protection,
if sufficiently broad, can prevent earlier than optimal deployment of inventions, albeit possibly at the risk of later than optimal deployment. This theme dates back to an article by
Yoram Barzel,159 which in turn inspired Kitch’s work,160 and
may be of even greater relative salience in the copyright context.
3. A Preliminary Rent Dissipation Model of Copyright
At first, it might appear that copyright law fails to curb
rent-dissipating activity, because the property rights of copyright law are much weaker than those of patent. While a patent
prevents follow-on innovation, copyright, in both doctrine and
rhetoric, encourages authors to take earlier authors’ ideas and
improve upon them, as long as they do so with original expression.161 If copyright law were designed single-mindedly, with
minimization of rent dissipation as a goal, it likely would not
allow this. Instead, copyright law might grant the first author
in a particular genre the derivative right to that genre, at least
158. For evaluations of the Grady-Alexander thesis, see Donald L. Martin,
Reducing Anticipated Rewards from Innovation Through Patents: Or Less Is
More, 78 VA. L. REV. 351 (1992); Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent
District: Observations on the Grady-Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359
(1992); and A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents—The
Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 284–86 (1996).
159. See Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 348, 354 (1968) (discussing the possibility of earlier-than-optimal deployment of an invention).
160. Kitch, supra note 138, at 265.
161. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) (“To give to the author of
the book an exclusive property in the art described therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a surprise and a
fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters-patent, not of copyright.”).
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for some period of time. And so, J.K. Rowling might have to pay
royalties to J.R.R. Tolkien, or the first cookbook to illustrate
recipes with step-by-step pictures might be able to prevent publication of subsequent works.
A copyright law with such broad rights, call it a “supercopyright” regime, is almost certainly unattractive. Authors
who obtained supercopyrights would have an incentive to license works beyond their own, but the result would be a far
lower number of works than currently exists, likely at least by
an order of magnitude. The product differentiation and rent
dissipation literatures recognize that there is some benefit to
product diversity that market entrants cannot capture.162 Although providing individual copyright owners control over entire genres of works would limit rent seeking, it would prevent
not only attempts to obtain rents by producing relatively redundant works, but also attempts to obtain rents by producing
creative works that would add substantially to consumer surplus. Supercopyright owners would have relatively little incentive to innovate, and copyright offerings would thus generally
be boring. Authors, moreover, would set relatively high prices
for their works,163 producing deadweight loss.
The supercopyright regime, moreover, would be difficult to
administer. Patent offices and courts make judgments about
the scope of patent rights, but the universe of ideas that would
be copyrightable subject matter would be larger than the universe of patentable subject matter.164 It is, of course, the specter of a supercopyright office making substantive assessments
that would be the greatest concern, even if we had confidence

162. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 112, at 256–59 (arguing that copyright law
should seek to increase authors’ ability to appropriate surplus).
163. If copyright is a natural monopoly, some form of natural monopoly
regulation might be used to control prices. See generally POSNER, supra note
127, at 377–96 (describing the economic justification for price regulation of
natural monopoly common carriers). The task might be far more difficult given
the number and diversity of copyrighted works, however.
164. The number of copyrights (under current rules at least) dwarfs the
number of patents. In 2001, the Copyright Office registered 601,659 claims.
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS: COPYRIGHT LAW ADMINISTRATION (2001), available at http://www
.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2001/law.pdf. In the same year, 326,508 patent
applications were filed with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. See U.S.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT ACTIVITY CALENDAR YEARS 1790 TO
THE PRESENT (2005), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts
.htm. This understates the difference between the number of copyrights and
patents, however, as registration is not required for copyright protection.

ABRAMOWICZ_3FMT

2005]

12/22/2005 10:49:18 AM

A THEORY OF THE DERIVATIVE RIGHT

357

that the relevant officials had all the tools they would need to
make copyright run smoothly. Freedom of speech may not be
absolute, but preventing someone from expressing an idea in
any form or writing in a particular genre would seem to be a
paradigmatic violation of freedom of speech. First Amendment
doctrine, of course, tolerates the current copyright regime,165
but granting the copyright office or even the courts the power to
determine whether an idea is original or derivative would be
dangerous, as would a copyright regime that allows the initiator of an idea to prevent others from repeating it.
For these reasons, then, this supercopyright regime is intolerable. Copyright law must allow a great deal of rentdissipating production of copyrighted works, because we cannot
have agencies and courts making case-by-case determinations
of the value that individual works provide. That does not, however, mean that copyright law should necessarily give up on
limiting rent dissipation. There may be some relatively easy-toapply rules that can limit some forms of rent dissipation, without undue affront to other values that copyright seeks to protect. The following two modifications, for example, might make
the supercopyright regime palatable: First, we might allow free
copying of ideas. Second, we might limit the genres over which
a copyright owner could exert control to those in which the
genre is encapsulated by the copyright owner’s expression (for
example, in delineating a particular character) rather than by
an idea. These are significant exceptions, but ones that might
limit competition among works using substantially similar expression. What would such a copyright system look like? Much
like the one that we actually have.
C. APPLICATION TO THE DERIVATIVE RIGHT AND RELATED
DOCTRINES
1. The Derivative Right Reconsidered
Rent dissipation theory provides a straightforward explanation of the derivative right. Critically, the central concern is
not that derivative works may be redundant with the original.
165. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (detailing the
interaction between First Amendment and the fundamental principles of copyright); Roy Export Co. v. CBS, Inc., 672 F.2d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1982) (“No
circuit . . . has ever held that the First Amendment provides a privilege in the
copyright field distinct from any accommodation embodied in the ‘fair use’ doctrine.”).
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If redundancy between the original and derivative works were
the concern, then copyright law could employ additional strategies to discourage even the original author from creating derivative works, for example by providing that derivative works
do not enjoy the protection of copyright’s reproduction right.
Under such a bizarre rule, J.K. Rowling would have exclusive
rights to write a Harry Potter sequel, but anyone would be able,
subject only to trademark restrictions,166 to sell pirated copies
of that work. Such a rule would be not only unjust but also unwise, because derivative works are rarely redundant with the
corresponding original works in the critical sense of competing
for the same market share. A derivative work will rarely steal
much business from the earlier original work,167 so even if a derivative work and the original work share many similarities,
the later work will almost never be a substitute for the earlier
one.168
The concern, rather, is that derivative works will be redundant with one another. If anyone were allowed to create derivative works, entry would come close to dissipating entirely
the rents associated with commercial exploitation of the relevant expression. Rent dissipation may not be complete; moviegoers may prefer the authorized Harry Potter sequel or movie
to those produced by unofficial imitators, so the original author
would still be able to exploit the work through transformations
to some extent.169 But the competition among the unauthorized
166. The Supreme Court recently showed some reluctance to allow trademark doctrine to protect works no longer protected by copyright. See Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film, Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 36–37 (2003) (holding that the Lanham Act does not require copiers of an uncopyrighted work to
credit the original authors of the work).
167. There may be exceptions. For example, someone might decide to rent a
mobster movie and choose between The Godfather and The Godfather II. The
films, however, are more often likely to be complements than substitutes.
168. In some contexts, it may be straightforward to imagine knockoff derivative works that would steal business, for example, purses that borrow
themes from designer models. Fashion designs, however, are ordinarily not
protected by copyright. See generally Leslie J. Hagin, A Comparative Analysis
of Copyright Laws Applied to Fashion Works: Renewing the Proposal for Folding Fashion Works into the United States Copyright Regime, 26 TEX. INT’L L.J.
341 (1991) (discussing copyright’s treatment of fashion design). At the same
time, it is difficult to think of knockoffs in categories of derivative works. Even
if Harry Potter leads to the creation of some additional books about wizards, it
seems unlikely that many customers who otherwise would have purchased
Harry Potter would have purchased these books instead.
169. See supra note 132 and accompanying text (noting that rent dissipation will not be complete where parties are not identically situated).
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creators probably would at least dissipate any rents for unauthorized versions, because unauthorized entry would continue
until expected profits are zero. In addition, the unauthorized
works would dissipate a portion of the rent that the original author would otherwise enjoy from authorized derivatives, though
rent dissipation here will be incomplete because unauthorized
authors will never be able to create authorized derivative
works. Once again, the concern here is not with redundancy in
an informal sense, for derivative works will generally bear
more resemblance to an original than to one another. Rather, it
is with redundancy in an economic sense, the danger of excessive entry into product space. Even if a group of derivative
works differs in ways that seem relevant from a literary or aesthetic perspective, they may all be targeting the same consumer demand.
Some derivative works will have high social value, but
copyright law does not prevent the production of such works.
Rather, it places the decision whether to produce derivative
works associated with a particular instance of expression in a
single actor, the copyright holder, who has incentives to consider both the demand diversion associated with the new work
as well as demand creation, the demand that otherwise would
go unsatisfied. The copyright holder’s incentive is to maximize
the rent and thus to minimize wasteful rent dissipation. Of
course, there are circumstances in which a copyright holder
might seek to block a derivative work not because the copyright
holder fears business stealing, but because the derivative work
entails a message that the copyright holder dislikes or fears
will undermine the original work. These circumstances, however, are for the fair use doctrine to take into account.170
Perhaps even more importantly, the derivative right may
reduce rent dissipation not only by reducing the number of

170. The Supreme Court held that this type of harm alone cannot serve as
the basis of a claimed copyright violation. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510
U.S. 569, 591–92 (1994) (“[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills demand for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act.”). The problem is that there may be works that both
compete with authorized derivative works and entail a message that the copyright holder dislikes. See generally Laura Bradford, Parody and Perception:
Using Cognitive Research to Expand Fair Use in Copyright, 46 B.C. L. REV.
705 (2005) (arguing that copyright theorists have paid insufficient attention to
attempts by copyright owners to block works that may undermine the message
of the original). Whether the fair use doctrine should protect such works is beyond the scope of this Article.
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relatively redundant works, but also by eliminating the suboptimally early release of adaptations. The problem is partly that
consumers would have been harmed by a release of a movie
version of Harry Potter almost simultaneously with publication
of the book.171 An owner of a derivative right has an incentive
to take into account that a long period in which consumers anticipate an adaptation may increase consumers’ enjoyment of
the adaptation, but in the absence of the derivative right, firstmover advantages would produce a copyright race. More importantly, the race to create adaptations may result in higher costs
and lower quality. Lower quality works may take less time to
complete and hit the market first, and the consumers who purchase these works may have less of an appetite for future derivatives than they would have had if the initial works were of
higher quality.172 No doubt, J.K. Rowling would have had many
readers for her authorized sequels even if dozens of unauthorized sequels had appeared in the interim, but it is not implausible that her publisher would have rushed her to minimize
consumer fatigue.
A derivative right greatly reduces the possibility of inefficient races after the initial creation of copyrighted expression.
Of course, patents solve postinvention rent dissipation only at
the expense of races to obtain patents, so we must assess
whether the derivative right could produce races to obtain
copyrights.173 The derivative right, however, is not so broad as
to make such races possible. Because the derivative right covers only expression and not ideas, and because the number of
171. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (noting that time lags may
increase consumer excitement and thus enjoyment of the copyrighted works).
172. A recent example occurs beyond the scope of the derivative right as
one television network hastily produced a boxing reality show to beat a rival to
the punch. See Dave Walker, Do the Fight Thing: Fox’s Reality Rip-Off Proves
That All Is Fair in Love and Boxing, TIMES–PICAYUNE, Sept. 7, 2004, at D1,
available at 2004 WLNR 1555138.
173. Copyright races are rare under current copyright law because the first
person to obtain a copyright does not obtain a copyright on the genre as a
whole. If patent law were also nonexclusive, there similarly would likely be
fewer patent races, and indeed one commentator has suggested a nonexclusive
patent system for this reason. See John S. Leibovitz, Note, Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, 111 YALE L.J. 2251, 2253 (2002). The difficult question
is whether a nonexclusive patent system would lead to more or less redundant
development. Id. at 2268–72. Leibovitz points out that inventors would have
an incentive to license their technological advances to firms lagging behind
them in development, since those firms would be able to obtain patent rights
as well. Id. at 2272. But laggards might be less likely to drop out of a patent
race for precisely this reason.
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ways that themes can be expressed is virtually infinite, the protection of the derivative right provides no incentive to race.
There may still be races, for example, to produce the first asteroid movie, but the derivative right will not make such races
any more fierce. The existence of the derivative right may well
increase total investment in works from which derivative rights
might follow, but this seems unlikely to increase the total number of works created.174 The derivative right thus does not demand the subtle balancing of alternative forms of rent dissipation assessed by Grady and Alexander in the patent context.175
The derivative right eliminates racing to develop adaptations of
existing expression, without fostering races to create expression
in the first place. Increases in patent scope, by contrast, reduce
rent dissipation in seeking improvements, but increase the inefficiency of patent races to obtain the invention initially.
The breadth of the derivative right, however, is not without
social cost. The copyright holder may be able to charge more for
derivative works because of the exclusive derivative right, thus
increasing deadweight loss.176 It is possible that this social loss
could exceed the benefit of minimizing rent dissipation, but
Congress has plausibly struck the right balance. Allowing monopolization of genres defined by ideas might create a great
deal of market power, but allowing monopolization of genres
defined by expression seems likely to create less market power,
because the relevant markets will be smaller. Not anyone can
make a Freddy Krueger film, but Freddy at least has to compete with Jason for ticket and video sales.177 Even the most
popular derivative works are generally priced at approximately
the same level as other works,178 so it seems doubtful that
174. See supra Part I.A.
175. See supra notes 152–57 and accompanying text.
176. See generally Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of
Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 99–100 (1997) (explaining
how copyright law may create deadweight loss).
177. Unless, of course, the owners of the respective copyrights authorize a
joint derivative work. See FREDDY VS. JASON (New Line Cinema 2003).
178. All 870 pages of one of the most recent Harry Potter books, J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE ORDER OF THE PHOENIX (2003), could have been
yours in hardcover at the time of this publication for just $19.20, and it was
priced at $29.99 upon release. See http://www.amazon.com (search for “Harry
Potter and the Order of the Phoenix”) (last visited Nov. 5, 2005). This pricing
strategy may seem surprising, considering the number of people who likely
would be willing to pay $40 for the book. The strategy, however, may be dictated by a large number of anticipated marginal buyers. Or perhaps the publisher worries that a high price would lead even some who value Harry Potter
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deadweight loss from high pricing is unusually high.
The greater concern is that the derivative right may overcompensate for the problems it fixes. Because copyright owners
cannot capture the full social value of their creations, they may
have a tendency to produce too few derivative works. A copyright owner will keep producing derivatives until the marginal
private benefit is equal to the marginal private cost. The marginal private benefit of creating a derivative work may be lower
than the social benefit. This effect, however, seems likely to be
small, because as long as there is consumer interest in new derivative works, authors (or at least publishers) in due time will
have incentives to oblige. Conceivably, copyright owners might
wait an inefficiently long time between adaptations, but this
too seems to be an unlikely concern. In patent law, waiting may
lower production costs as the price of inputs falls, but for copyrighted works, production costs will not necessarily go down
over time.179
It is possible, of course, that some compromise between the
derivative right as it currently exists and a regime without
such a right would be optimal. Perhaps a profit-allocation approach along the lines suggested by Rubenfeld could help
achieve an appropriate balance,180 but the transaction costs of
such a system might well be sufficiently great to offset any increase in efficiency that it might provide. Moreover, rent dissipation theory shows that the approach might be little different
from a regime of no derivative right. If anyone could make a
derivative work, then entry would be expected to dissipate
away economic profit in any event. So on average, each author
of an unauthorized derivative work would earn zero economic
profit. Zero economic profit is shorthand for a normal rate of return.181 Therefore, depending on the accounting scheme employed, the original author might actually receive something,
especially since the author would enjoy a portion of the upside
benefit of derivative works, without assuming any of the risk
at more than that price not to buy because they may believe they are being
cheated.
179. Even in film, technology improvements do not necessarily make movies any cheaper, as consumers have higher expectations for special effects. See,
e.g., Paul Vlahos, The Zbig Movie Miracle, http://zbigvision.com/MovieMiracle
.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005) (noting that the cost of producing movies has
not fallen over time, even after adjusting for inflation).
180. See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 108, at 51 nn.48–49 and accompanying text.
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that a derivative work might suffer a loss. But depending on
the profit percentage, such royalties may well be quite small.
Does the derivative right provide the optimal copyright
law? Certainly the derivative right leaves many forms of redundancy, including redundant development of uncopyrighted
works.182 At the same time, the derivative right might be narrower. For example, copyright law might explicitly consider the
number of existing or planned derivative works to determine
the extent of redundancy and allow works where derivative
rights in essence have been abandoned.183 Just because rent
dissipation concerns help explain portions of copyright doctrine,
however, does not mean that copyright doctrine would be improved if rent dissipation concerns were considered explicitly
on a case-by-case basis. The expense and uncertainty associated with such analyses may not be worth the benefits. Copyright law generally and the derivative right specifically are
blunt instruments, but at least in an approximate way they reflect rent dissipation concerns.
2. The Reproduction Right Reconsidered
Rent dissipation theory applies equally to explain the
breadth of the reproduction right: if there is a rent from further
development of a particular character or plot line, the law can
eliminate dissipation of that rent by providing a property right
to that development. It is one thing for Sylvester Stallone to
subject us to Rocky II–V, and possibly even a dreaded Rocky
VI,184 but quite another if several other studios got into the act.
Such a development seems unlikely for the Rocky series, given
that a Rocky movie without Stallone would likely not sell well,
but Stallone can prevent the use of his image only because of
present technological limitations185 and because the right of
182. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text (providing examples).
183. Lawrence Lessig has argued for requiring de minimis copyright renewal fees to ensure that abandoned works are placed in the public domain.
See Lawrence Lessig, The Public Domain Enhancement Act FAQ,
http://eldred.cc/ea_faq.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005) (proposing the Eric Eldred Act); Capitol Hill, WASH. INTERNET DAILY, June 25, 2003, available at
http://www.lexis.com (noting Lessig’s involvement).
184. See Josh Grossberg, Stallone Ready for “Rocky” Redux, EONLINE, Dec.
12, 2002, http://www.eonline.com/News/Items/0,1,10969,00.htm?newsrellink.
185. But cf. Rod Easdown, Digital Stars, THE AGE, Jan. 16, 2002, at B1,
available at 2002 WLNR 11861306 (describing the use of digital effects to put
dead actors in new movies). See generally Joseph J. Beard, Casting Call at
Forest Lawn: The Digital Resurrection of Deceased Entertainers—A 21st Cen-
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publicity may similarly prevent rent dissipation.186 In any
event, copyright law can save us from innumerable unauthorized sequels to The Lion King or unauthorized James Bond
movies starring a new actor as Bond,187 even if trademark law
somehow should turn out not to be up to the task. Copyright
law can save us from unauthorized Lion King stuffed animals
and 007 martini glasses as well.
Rent dissipation theory, of course, does not apply as far as
it might. Sylvester Stallone did not receive a monopoly on boxing movies, and not just because pictures like On the Waterfront188 established the genre before Stallone’s involvement.
Copyright law does not extend property rights so far that subsequent authors’ freedom to express ideas and pursue broad
themes is limited. This is reflected, for example, in the scènes à
faire doctrine, which allows the use of “stock” literary devices,
such as scenes in a beer hall and the singing of the German national anthem in a film about the Nazis,189 even though some
copyrightable work must have been the first to use such a device. Case law on parody, allowing some parodies to count as
fair use even though they infringe, provides another important
limit on copyright protection.190 Once again, though, my claim
is not that rent dissipation is copyright’s only concern. To the
extent that copyright protection for characters is surprisingly
broad, rent dissipation theory provides an explanation.
The challenge for courts is determining whether a finding
that a copyright exists would amount to giving a monopoly over
a genre, or whether it would only prevent rent dissipating uses
of the plaintiff ’s work. Copyright is relatively difficult to obtain
for literary characters, because these characters are less developed and thus copyright might amount to a monopoly in a partury Challenge for Intellectual Property Law, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 101 (1993)
(considering the intellectual property consequences of reanimation).
186. See Mark F. Grady, A Positive Economic Theory of the Right of Publicity, 1 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 97, 111–12 (1994).
187. The possibility that competitors might produce different Bondses is
not altogether hypothetical. Keith Poliakoff, Note, License to Copyright: The
Ongoing Dispute Over the Ownership of James Bond, 18 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 387, 388 (2000) (describing a controversy over ownership of the
James Bond character).
188. ON THE WATERFRONT (Columbia Pictures 1954).
189. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir.
1980) (finding this expression not to be copyrightable).
190. For a discussion of parody doctrine, see Alfred C. Yen, When Authors
Won’t Sell: Parody, Fair Use, and Efficiency in Copyright Law, 62 U. COLO. L.
REV. 79 (1991).
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ticular type of person.191 A close case not involving copyright on
characters is Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co.192 The case concerned
the copyrightability of a series of greeting cards.193 The allegedly infringing greeting cards were stylistically similar to the
originals, with respect to variables such as size, border, and
script typeface, and both sets of cards included sentimental
phrases, including the use of ellipses,194 but the phrases themselves were not copied.195 The court found copyrightability in
the arrangement and found infringement as well.196 This case
is troubling because it appears to give a monopoly over the
most obvious style for implementing the idea of sentimental
phrase greeting cards. The court’s emphasis on alternative
styles that the infringer might have adopted,197 however, reveals that the court at least was convinced that it was not
granting a monopoly over the genre as a whole.
The questions of copyright law are often fact-specific, and
rent dissipation theory cannot provide general answers. Even
where inquiries are not fact-specific, cases can be close. Consider, for example, whether software manufacturers should be
able to protect user interfaces. The case law is inconsistent,198
191. Paul Goldstein suggests the following test for a literary character:
A literary character can be said to have a distinctive personality, and
thus to be protectible, when it has been delineated to the point at
which its behavior is relatively predictable so that, when placed in a
new plot situation, it will react in ways that are at once distinctive
and unsurprising.
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 2.7.2 (1998). This test is not entirely satisfying. Certain stereotyped characters can be scarcely delineated and yet have
predictable behavior, while others may be well delineated and yet part of their
delineation may be that they are unpredictable. Rent dissipation theory suggests that the test should simply be whether the presence of the character is a
significant factor in why people purchase the book. With this approach, an unauthorized Rocky movie would infringe, but a two-minute peripheral scene involving Rocky Balboa would not.
192. 886 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1989).
193. Id. at 934.
194. A particularly awful example: “‘I want to shout and tell the world how
much I love you . . . but instead I’ll just . . . whisper.’” Id. at 935.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 940.
197. See, e.g., id. (“Berrie could have produced a non-infringing card with
colored stripes, but Berrie used similar stripes flanking the verse on both the
left and right side from top to bottom just as the FS cards did.”).
198. Compare Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 807 (1st
Cir. 1995) (finding that Lotus 1–2–3’s menu command hierarchy was not copyrightable and thus not infringed by rival spreadsheet program Quattro Pro),
with Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 1371–73 (10th Cir. 1997) (rejecting
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and so is the rent dissipation analysis.199 On one hand, once a
company has developed an effective user interface, allowing
other software companies to take it is likely to dissipate the
rent from the interface. On the other hand, software companies
would still be able to dissipate the rent by offering competing
programs with alternative user interfaces, and requiring companies that will enter the market anyway to develop an alternative interface will increase the fixed costs of entry and thus
rent dissipation. An additional consideration is the burden on
users having to learn multiple interfaces. It is unclear which
way this cuts. While the burden itself is a form of redundancy
and thus akin to rent dissipation, it also may limit the number
of firms that will choose to enter if a property right is found.200
Given this complicated balancing, it is perhaps unsurprising
that this remains a controversial area of copyright law.201
3. The Copyright Term Reconsidered
A perhaps surprising corollary to rent dissipation theory’s
explanation of the broad derivative and reproduction rights is
that rent dissipation theory can help provide an explanation for
the long copyright term.202 The Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Lotus and finding command codes protectible). The technical issue in these
cases was whether the menu commands were a “method of operation” and
thus not copyrightable under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). Lotus, 49 F.3d at 816;
Mitel, 124 F.3d at 1371–72. The Mitel court argued that even if the commands
were a method of operation, the expression within them could still be copyrighted. Id. at 1372.
199. An additional complicating factor in some cases is the difficulty of
separating the user interface from the underlying functionality. See, e.g.,
Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614–19 (7th
Cir. 1982) (addressing whether a game similar to Pac Man was infringing),
superceded by statute on other grounds, FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a), as recognized in
Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1985).
200. A reverse balance exists in assessing the social welfare consequences
of network externalities. See Abramowicz, supra note 108, at 86–88 (discussing network externalities and copyright). On one hand, network externalities
confer a direct benefit on consumers, but they also may hurt consumers if they
discourage new innovations. The twist here is that learning a new interface
imposes a cost on consumers, but it may benefit society indirectly by discouraging redundant entry.
201. For recent assessments of protection for software, see generally Bruce
Abramson, Promoting Innovation in the Software Industry: A First Principles
Approach to Intellectual Property Reform, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 75, 122–23
(2002), and Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Legal Protection for Software: Still a
Work in Progress, 8 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 445, 448 (2002).
202. A separate puzzle concerning the copyright term is that it is ordinarily
based on the life of the author. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
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Extension Act (CTEA) granted a twenty-year term extension
for both existing and future works,203 providing a term of life of
the author plus seventy years, or, in the case of works made for
hire, a fixed term of the lesser of ninety-five years from the
year of first publication or 120 years from creation.204 The Supreme Court upheld the CTEA in Eldred v. Ashcroft,205 though
even if the Court had struck it down, the copyright term would
still be quite long, both by historical standards206 and in comparison to the patent term.207
The copyright term seems almost impossible to justify on
traditional incentives grounds. A brief by prominent economists
in support of the challenge to the term extension calculated
that the term extension would produce a 0.33 percent increase
in present value for a new work protected by copyright,208 and
even that is generous, given the economists’ assumption that
the work produces equal revenues each year. Perhaps publishers are savvy enough to incorporate such anticipated future
revenues into the payments they offer authors, but the amount
is so small that it could lead to only a very small increase in the
number of works.209 The small increase in present value for
Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.). For a behavioral economics resolution of this puzzle, see Avishalom
Tor & Dotan Oliar, Incentives to Create Under a “Lifetime-Plus-Years” Copyright Duration: Lessons from a Behavioral Economic Analysis for Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 437 (2002). Rent dissipation theory offers a
complementary explanation, that a work is less likely to be commercialized far
beyond the author’s death and that the author’s life thus helps identify the period in which use would likely amount to rent dissipation. Because authors
often do not own copyrights in their creations, this factor will often not be significant, but it may have been more significant in earlier times.
203. Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 301–304 (2000)).
204. Id. § 102(b) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)–(c)).
205. 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003).
206. For a brief history of the copyright term, see Joseph A. Lavigne,
Comment, For Limited Times? Making Rich Kids Richer via the Copyright
Term Extension Act of 1996, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 311, 315–21 (1996).
207. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000) (providing for a term of twenty years from
the date the patent application was filed). For a criticism of this disparity, see
Edward C. Walterscheid, The Remarkable—and Irrational—Disparity Between the Patent Term and the Copyright Term, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 233 (2001).
208. Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618).
209. This consideration helps identify a problem with what might appear to
be a case based on rent dissipation theory for a short copyright term. At first
blush, a rent dissipation theory of copyright might seem to predict a relatively
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new works, as the economists’ brief recognized, may not be dispositive, because the costs of a term extension would be borne
in the future and thus should be discounted as well.210 The ratio of deadweight loss to consumer surplus may be roughly
comparable for both old and new works, if the demand and
marginal revenue curves do not change shape over time. But
other costs, particularly the “tracing costs” of identifying copyright owners and seeking permission to reproduce works,211 will
become considerably higher over time.
An incentives argument in any event cannot justify a retroactive term extension, because a copyright term extension
cannot increase incentives to create works that already exist.
At best, a retroactive term extension might lead publishers to
anticipate future retroactive term extensions, but simply granting an even longer prospective extension would appear on an
incentives rationale to be a more direct, if still flawed, approach. Meanwhile, there might appear to be several costs of a
retroactive extension, as the economists’ brief argued. First, the
term extension will produce deadweight loss from monopoly
pricing.212 Second, the extension will reduce innovation by restricting the production of new creative works using existing
materials.213 Third, the property right will lead to costly bargaining and contracting.214
The economists’ conclusion that the first and third arguments imply costs seem accurate, but the second argument is

short term. If many copyrighted works are redundant, then a short term
would result in the production of fewer works, and rent dissipation theory
suggests that the decrease in incentives to produce new works might be welfare improving, or at least not as welfare reducing as would appear in the absence of the theory. This consideration, however, is small, because the present
discounted value of revenues from copyright many years in the future are
small.
210. Brief of George A. Akerlof et al., supra note 208, at 2 (“With respect to
the term extension for new works, the present value of the additional cost is
small, just as the present value of incremental benefits is small.”). Landes and
Posner identify the possibility of an argument that the appropriate discount
rate for the costs might be lower than that for the benefits. See William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 471, 481 n.22 (2003).
211. See Landes & Posner, supra note 210, at 477–78.
212. Brief of George A. Akerlof et al., supra note 208, at 10–11.
213. Id. at 12–13 (“If the later innovator must pay for use of the earlier
work, this will raise the innovator's cost of making new works, reducing the
set of new works produced.”).
214. Id. at 13–14.
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more problematic.215 The economists seem to assume that production of new works using existing materials necessarily will
be socially beneficial,216 but they do not even acknowledge the
industrial organization literature that points out the possibility
of excessive entry.217 Nor do they recognize the possibility that
even if entry is not excessive, new creative works produced
from existing materials, even if representing commercially significant improvements over those materials, may tend to be redundant with one another. And the economists do not acknowledge that in the rare cases when a work remains valuable as a
source for adaptations when its copyright expires, a rentdissipating race to produce adaptations might result. Rent dissipation theory, by contrast, identifies unrestricted use of existing materials to produce new ones, i.e., the unauthorized creation of derivative works as precisely the type of use most likely
to be economically inefficient.
The debate on the CTEA has focused intensely on just such
a use, as commentators have recognized that Disney has lobbied in favor of the extension in order to protect its copyright on
Mickey Mouse.218 The assumption that Mickey Mouse’s entry
into the public domain would be welfare enhancing is perplexing, even absent the analysis in this Article. Should Mickey
Mouse enter the public domain, there might be reduced monopoly pricing of Steamboat Willie, but that benefit seems trivial
and is not the focus of the statute’s critics.219 The more significant effect would be to allow, subject to trademark limita-

215. An additional complication is that the copyright extension may encourage investment in existing works, for example in the colorization of a
black-and-white movie. See Landes & Posner, supra note 210, at 490–91. For
an argument that the Copyright Clause is not concerned with this class of
public goods problems, see Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and Public
Goods: Trading Gold for Dross, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 159, 165 (2002).
216. The assumption is also clear elsewhere in the brief. See, e.g., Brief of
George A. Akerlof et al., supra note 208, at 8–9 (“One might argue that the
windfall to authors of existing copyrights has a positive consequence, by providing them with more resources for additional creative projects.”).
217. See supra Part II.A.
218. See, e.g., Dinitia Smith, Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even
Mickey Mouse Joins the Fray, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1998, at B7 (discussing the
relevance of Mickey Mouse to the debate over the copyright extension).
219. A proponent of the term extension makes a similar point. See Scott M.
Martin, The Mythology of the Public Domain: Exploring the Myths Behind Attacks on the Duration of Copyright Protection, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253, 317–
18 (2002) (“Is there a huge market anxiously awaiting the royalty-free distribution of a 1928 black-and-white cartoon over the Internet?”).
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tions,220 anyone to insert Mickey Mouse into their own films
and comic books. Do we really need even more Mickey Mouse
movies and comic books than we already have? The term extension critics seem to assume that we do, and perhaps they are
right. Parodic uses of Mickey Mouse especially might be enriching,221 but encouraging such uses seems more relevant to fair
use analysis, which already considers parody.222
Rent dissipation theory, however, suggests that the benefits of increased production to even devoted fans of Mickey are
likely to be relatively small.223 Consumer welfare might well
rise from the availability of additional sources for Mickey products, even though many consumers would probably have interest only in Disney-certified products. But if there were a rent to
be made from unauthorized Mickey Mouse T-shirts, comic
books, and movies, the competition among Disney competitors
to produce such materials likely would dissipate that rent almost completely.224 Moreover, the competition would lead to a
race to produce derivative works, possibly lowering quality.
Disney, of course, recognized this and presumably feared it, as
royalties from Steamboat Willie seem unlikely to be sufficient
to justify Disney’s lobbying. These costs are at least what animated Disney and explain the long copyright term, regardless
of whether they produce a sufficiently strong normative justification for it.
Even with the benefit of rent dissipation theory, the term
extension question is not easy. The deadweight costs of monopoly pricing for existing works and the transactions costs of negotiating licenses may make the copyright term extension inefficient, and rent dissipation theory cannot prove that increases
to consumer welfare from increased production of derivative

220. See id. at 317 n.184 (asserting that Disney has trademark rights to
use of Mickey Mouse for numerous products).
221. But see Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 752 (9th Cir.
1978) (involving the use of Mickey Mouse in adult comic books). Perhaps the
more accurate statement would be that parodic uses of Mickey Mouse especially have the potential to be enriching, even if one concludes that the particular parodic use in Air Pirates was more prurient than enriching.
222. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
223. It is possible that entry could produce price competition, allowing
Mickey fans to obtain products at lower prices and reduce deadweight cost as
well. Casual empiricism, however, suggests that such effects are likely to be
small—all movies rent for the same price at Blockbuster.
224. See supra Part II.B.1 (introducing rent dissipation).

ABRAMOWICZ_3FMT

2005]

12/22/2005 10:49:18 AM

A THEORY OF THE DERIVATIVE RIGHT

371

works will be less than the harm borne by producers. Rent dissipation theory provides a plausible defense of a long copyright
term,225 but I mean only to suggest that rent dissipation theory
provides a better explanation, not that it provides a convincing
one.226
Rent dissipation theory, however, can provide, at best, only
a defense of the lengthy protection that the derivative right enjoys. It cannot explain why there also is a long copyright term
for the reproduction right (or, more specifically, for the reproduction right’s prohibition on direct copying of copyrighted
works). A superficially simple answer is that copyright law provides a single copyright term for all of the exclusive rights.
Given that constraint, the determination of the copyright term,
which requires a balancing of factors at different possible terminal dates, should depend more on the economics associated
with the derivative right than the economics associated with
the reproduction right. The derivative right’s relative importance increases throughout the copyright term, as the Mickey
Mouse example usefully illustrates. Rent dissipation theory
provides some support for a copyright term that lasts until
drawbacks, like high tracing costs, become overwhelming.227

225. In the absence of a rent dissipation theory, the long copyright term
seems explainable only as the worst form of political rent seeking. See, e.g.,
Richard Epstein, All Roads Lead to Rome, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2002, available
at 2002 WLNR 6722325 (calling the CTEA “a state giveaway of public domain
property, pure and simple”). Arguably, the term extension might reduce costs
associated with political rent seeking since the enactment of the statute will
leave advocates with nothing more to lobby for. See Landes & Posner, supra
note 210, at 483–84. The success of the term extension movement, however,
might encourage other rent seekers.
226. It seems particularly problematic that the term extension even covers
works that are no longer being exploited by their owners, for use of such works
is not likely to be rent dissipating. Individually, such works are generally of
little commercial value, but collectively they might have considerable value,
and a regime requiring frequent modest payments to renew copyrights, as
suggested recently by Landes and Posner, seems sensible. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 210. Landes and Posner note that most copyrights
become valueless by the time of the first renewal period, as evidenced by the
high percentage of copyright holders who fail to pay the small renewal fee. See
id. at 501–03. I criticize the argument that they raise in favor of a long copyright term in Abramowicz, supra note 108, at 82–86.
227. This might provide a defense of a copyright term that becomes longer
over time, as modern technology is likely to reduce the importance of tracing
costs. There may well be competing considerations, however, and elsewhere I
argue that there are strong reasons that copyright law should generally become weaker over time. See Abramowicz, supra note 108, at 108–09.
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This analysis, however, rests on the assumption that copyright law provides the same term for the reproduction and derivative rights. Providing a different term for the different
rights would be simple as a matter of legislative drafting, but
that masks an underlying complication. For copyright law to
provide different reproduction and derivative terms, it would
need to find a conceptual means of distinguishing the reproduction and derivative rights. We will now turn to that project.
III. REDEFINING THE REPRODUCTION AND
DERIVATIVE RIGHTS
Rent dissipation theory provides a straightforward basis
for distinguishing the derivative right from the reproduction
right, to the extent that the latter extends beyond direct copying. The purpose of such a project, of course, is not to help Congress should it ever choose to mandate separate copyright
terms, an unlikely prospect. Rather, in distinguishing the
rights, we may be able to clarify their scope, and such clarification may help in hard cases. In particular, such clarification
may help prevent applications of those rights that do not advance their underlying purposes, best conceived. Though this
Article praises the derivative right, I write also in part to bury
some of its more aggressive applications.
A. ECONOMIC TESTS
1. The Tests
Rent dissipation theory provides for straightforward,
though not mechanical, definitions of the reproduction and derivative rights. Recall that while the central concern of the reproduction right is that an unauthorized reproduction might
compete with the original, rent dissipation theory suggests that
a central concern of the derivative right is that unauthorized
derivative works might compete with one another.228 Rent dissipation alone cannot provide definitions of either right, as
many works that clearly do not violate either right compete
with both original works and their derivatives. For example, a
new action movie will compete with other previously released
action movies and with the sequels to those action movies.

228. See supra text accompanying notes 166–69.
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Once it is established, however, that an allegedly infringing work is substantially similar to an original work,229 consideration of demand diversion can help determine whether the
reproduction right, the derivative right, both, or neither are
violated. If the allegedly infringing work would be expected to
cause significant demand diversion from the original, then the
work would indeed infringe the reproduction right. If the allegedly infringing work would be expected to cause significant
demand diversion from actual or hypothetical transformations
that the original author plausibly might make, then it would
infringe the derivative right.230
2. Preliminary Illustrations
To clarify the definition and the type of evidence that litigants might introduce in litigation, let us start with a simple
illustration. Suppose that someone created an unauthorized sequel to the Harry Potter books, with the usual group of characters and the familiar if unpredictable setting of Hogwarts, but
an entirely new plot. It seems far-fetched to imagine even a
well-executed sequel taking away more than an insignificant
amount of business from the original Harry Potter book. Even if
the new work were priced at considerably less than the original, only an unusual customer would decide not to buy the
original because there existed a cheap imitation. In this respect, books are not like handbags. It is quite plausible, however, to imagine that a sequel might interfere with sales of authorized sequels as customers grow tired of reading Harry
Potter sequels, especially if the unauthorized sequel were to
beat an authorized one to market. Similarly, an unauthorized
movie version of Harry Potter probably would steal only a modest amount of business from the book, but it might steal a great
deal of business from the authorized movie.
This analysis may seem to succeed only at taking exceptionally easy cases and making them more complicated. The
copyright statute explicitly identifies a “motion picture version”
229. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
230. The central concern with the derivative right is rent dissipation
among all derivative works, including unauthorized derivative works. A test of
the derivative work concept, however, should relate semantically to the original work. Practically, this is essential too, as a court might need to assess
whether a work is a derivative work before other alleged derivative works are
even produced. Considering whether there would be significant demand diversion from authorized transformations provides a straightforward way of testing whether there is likely to be rent dissipation among derivative works.
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of a work as a derivative work,231 and a book sequel fits
squarely within the more general definition of a derivative
work, which includes “a work based upon one or more preexisting works.”232 My purpose, however, is to offer an economic cast
to the definition for a derivative work. Because competition will
always be a matter of degree, economic assessments will always be a matter of degree too, but this adds little uncertainty.
A test seeking to identify substantial similarity will not be mechanical in any event, and adding one subjective assessment
into an already subjective inquiry will not greatly compound
the problem. It is at least reassuring that paradigmatic examples of derivative works, such as movie sequels or book translations, appear to fit within this economic approach.
Let us now consider a slightly more difficult example. Suppose that someone without authorization took the movie Harry
Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone and electronically transformed
it, creating a black-and-white version. There is no doubt that
the black-and-white version would be substantially similar to
the original. The release would be a violation of the reproduction right, because a significant portion of any revenues from
the decolorized movie would likely come at the expense of the
original.233 That the black-and-white version might draw only a
few customers is not relevant. The proper inquiry is whether
these customers otherwise would have purchased the original.
Some customers might choose the black-and-white version because they thought that it was truer to the theme, while others
might favor the decolorized version because its producers sold
it for less money to undercut the original. Either way, demand
diversion seems likely to be substantial relative to sales of the
black-and-white version. Intuitively, the modification of the
original seems to be an attempt to evade the reproduction right.
The above definition of the reproduction right, however, makes
it possible to identify such attempts without any direct inquiry
into motive. Perhaps the decolorization reflects solely artistic
sensibilities, but that would not save the black-and-white version from violation of the reproduction right.
That is enough for the copyright holder to win, but let us
consider the derivative right as well. Of course, if anyone were
allowed to create decolorized videos and sell them, there would

231. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
232. Id.
233. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
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be rent-dissipating entry of decolorized versions and cut-rate
prices. But that is why the definition above looks for competition with actual and plausible authorized transformations,
even though the overall concern of the derivative right is demand diversion among all derivative works.234 Similarly, if the
Harry Potter producers did release a black-and-white version,
the two black-and-white versions might compete with one another for that very small market segment. That is why the
definition above considers only hypothetical transformations
that the original author plausibly might make. The inquiry
thus avoids tautology and demands a practical consideration of
the relevant market.
In this case, it seems unlikely that the black-and-white
Harry Potter would compete with other authorized transformations, in part because decolorization seems like a poor vehicle
for commercial exploitation of Harry Potter. The result is based
on empirical considerations, though, as it is possible to imagine
evidence that decolorization was a plausible means of exploiting the original. In a world in which movie producers regularly
released black-and-white versions to satisfy some portion of the
viewing public, the black-and-white version would violate the
derivative right as well as the reproduction right. The line admittedly is imprecise. There probably are a few customers who
would buy a black-and-white version. The challenge for the
court is to assess whether there are enough such customers to
make release of a black-and-white version a sensible means of
exploiting the copyright. Any evidence as to the movie studio’s
actual intent would be admissible, as would be evidence generated from market surveys. Such surveys, however, would need
to assess not simply how many consumers would prefer a blackand-white version, but also how many who would not purchase
the original would be interested in a black-and-white version. If
that number is sufficiently high, then the black-and-white version is a plausible transformation.
The decolorization example may appear to present a problem for this approach. Colorized versions of movies generally
are considered to be derivative works, so why should decolorized versions not automatically be treated in the same way?
The economic answer is that colorization, however artistically
objectionable, often is a logical way to exploit a movie commercially. Decolorization, on the other hand, seems far less likely to
234. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
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be commercially viable, as indicated by the lack of decolorized
authorized versions of movies at video rental stores. The result
is that unauthorized colorized versions plausibly might compete with authorized derivative adaptations, while unauthorized decolorized versions will not. As a result, decolorization
would violate the reproduction right, but not the derivative
right. This rent dissipation answer, however, may seem problematic from the perspective of the copyright statute. The definition of “derivative work” includes any “form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”235 If colorization is a
recasting, transformation, or adaptation, shouldn’t decolorization count as such as well?
An apparently easy answer may be that decolorization requires less originality or skill than colorization. Originality of
the modification made to a work might appear to be all that is
required under conventional glosses on the definition of “derivative work.”236 Rubenfeld endorses this definition as well.237
But if I accept this answer, then the rent dissipation approach
that I have suggested seems misplaced. The conventional approach scrutinizes the modifications themselves, not the effect
of the modifications on the work.238 The rent dissipation approach, in contrast, considers the effect of the modifications,
specifically by assessing the demand diversion that the new
work will effect from other authorized transformations (for the
derivative right) or from the original work (for the reproduction
right).239 Let us thus assume that colorization and decolorization are equally difficult tasks, both requiring a fair amount of
specifically applied artistic expertise. Given this assumption,
can we find some way of reconciling the economic test that I
have proposed with the statutory text?
3. Textual Defenses
I believe that we can, and indeed, that a reading of the
definition of “derivative right” that considers effects is more
consistent with the statutory text than one that seeks to iden235. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
236. See generally Steven S. Boyd, Deriving Originality in Derivative
Works: Considering the Quantum of Originality Needed to Attain Copyright
Protection in a Derivative Work, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 325 (2000).
237. See Rubenfeld, supra note 52 at 53–55.
238. See, e.g., Well-Made Toy Mfg. Corp. v. Goffa Int’l. Corp., 354 F.3d 112,
117 (2d Cir. 2003) (employing the conventional “substantial similarity” test).
239. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
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tify originality in modifications alone.240 Consider first the second sentence of the definition of “derivative work”: “A work
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or
other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original
work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’”241 The words “represent an . . . original work of authorship” indicate what Congress
implicitly envisioned.242 The modifications to a work must
themselves be original, for a nonoriginal modification can never
create something original. But that is not enough. The word
“represent” recognizes that modifications are not of interest in
and of themselves, but only in that they point to or symbolize
something broader. To consider whether modifications make a
derivative work, we cannot just look at the modifications themselves, but must look at whether the modifications represent an
original work.
Return now to the first sentence of the definition of “derivative right,” which reads in full: “A ‘derivative work’ is a
work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction,
abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work
may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”243 This sentence also
emphasizes the process of transformation. None of the examples envisions a simple injection of expression. Although two of
the examples—“abridgment” and “condensation”—envision a
removal of expression, those words are different from “deletion”
and plausibly can be read to exclude, for example, a version of a
novel with a few carefully selected words removed. A holistic

240. For the statutory definition, see 17 U.S.C. § 101.
241. Id.
242. The approach of examining the modifications themselves for originality might appear to find support in the words “as a whole.” This phrase, however, simply makes clear that the effect of modifications on the original work
must be examined as a whole. If the phrase meant only that all modifications
must be considered together, then the phrase would be superfluous. See, e.g.,
Platt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 99 U.S. 48, 58 (1878) (applying the canon that “a
legislature is presumed to have used no superfluous words”). In the absence of
the phrase “as a whole,” the sentence would refer to “modifications which represent an original work of authorship.” See 17 U.S.C. § 101. This is grammatically distinct from “modifications which represent original works of authorship.” The structure of the sentence thus already makes clear that the
modifications must be considered cumulatively, and the phrase “as a whole”
reflects that the cumulative effect of modifications can be assessed only
through consideration of the work itself.
243. 17 U.S.C. §107 (2000).
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approach similarly can give significance to the words “recast,
transformed, or adapted” in the first sentence of the definition
of “derivative work,” serving to distinguish them from weaker
alternatives like “modified” or “changed.” Here as well, Congress’s word choice suggests that legislators imagined both that
the transformation would involve some degree of originality
and that the result would be more than merely an altered work.
The most powerful argument, however, for considering the
effects of modifications rather than the modifications alone, is
based on logic rather than linguistic analysis. It is nonsensical
to assess modifications without at least some consideration of
the original work. Modifications have meaning only with respect to what is being modified, and whether modifications cumulatively represent an original work necessarily depends on
the degree to which the modified work is transformed. An approach that assesses whether modifications are sufficient without considering the effect of those modifications on the work in
effect looks at editing marks as if they were written on pages
formed in invisible ink that has since disappeared. Such an
analysis may be enough to determine whether the modifications themselves are original, but this is irrelevant when what
someone seeks to protect is not a set of modifications but a derivative work.
Copyright law may protect a haiku as completely as it protects an encyclopedia.244 And a haiku may be sufficiently original on its own that when added to another haiku, the collection
amounts to a derivative work of each haiku. But that does not
mean that when a haiku is added to an encyclopedia, we have a
new encyclopedia. Adding a haiku to an encyclopedia and then
reselling the product surely would violate the reproduction
right, but it should not be seen as violating the derivative right.
As both a matter of language and logic, the derivative right
has been misconceived by focusing solely on what is added
rather than on what is being added to. My analysis suggests
new definitions of both the derivative right and the reproduction right. As currently interpreted, the definition of reproduction would cover most derivative works because unauthorized
sequels and movies would probably count as unauthorized reproductions of characters, and possibly settings, under current

244. Some phrases may be so short that they are denied copyright protection. See, e.g., Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 266 F.2d 541,
544 (2d Cir. 1959) (requiring an “appreciable amount of original text”).
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law.245 In my definition, however, unauthorized sequels and
movies probably would not be covered by the reproduction right
because the adaptations will tend to compete only minimally
with the original work.246 A textual case for this redefinition of
the reproduction right is consistent with the textual case for
the redefinition of the derivative right. The reproduction right
is a right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords.”247 It is a stretch to consider the individual characters, rather than a Harry Potter book as a whole to, count as a
“work.”248 My definition thus offers a more plausible reading of
the statutory text for both rights.
B. APPLICATIONS
My suggested approach would not require wholesale repudiation of case law. Courts have adopted overlapping definitions of the reproduction and derivative rights in part because
litigants have had little incentive to encourage more precision
in separating the rights. In the vast majority of cases, distinguishing the rights would not make a difference in the ultimate
determination of whether there is a copyright violation. The
courts likely will never consider whether a decolorized movie
violated the derivative right, because it would violate the reproduction right.249 There are thus relatively few cases that
squarely force the courts to distinguish the rights. Fixing the
doctrine in this area might require the lower courts to repudiate statements in earlier cases, but not in a way that would af245. See supra Part I.B.
246. See supra text accompanying note 230.
247. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (Supp. II 2002).
248. An implication of my approach is thus that characters ordinarily
would not be independently copyrightable. Note that this would have little effect in the Stallone case, because in that case the script would have been an
unauthorized derivative work. See supra notes 41–49 and accompanying text.
The economic approach does not rule out altogether the possibility of copyright
on characters, however. Suppose, for example, that some people were in the
business of creating characters, which they would then sell to authors to incorporate in books. In that case, a character would be a work unto itself, but in
the absence of independent marketing and sale of characters, characters
would be part of other works. Moreover, this approach does not foreclose the
possibility that independent parts of a work, such as frames of a movie, would
be independently copyrightable. While a “character” does not seem to meet the
plain language definition of a “work,” see 17 U.S.C. § 106(1), a movie still
plausibly counts as an independent “work.” While an individual character ordinarily cannot be marketed independently of a broader work, a movie still
can be marketed independently.
249. See supra Part III.A.2.
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fect the result of the vast majority. The Supreme Court, in any
event, has had no occasion to clarify the difference between the
reproduction and derivative rights, and might usefully clarify
the difference between the doctrines.
1. The Derivative Right
Because of the overlap in existing doctrine governing the
reproduction right and the derivative right, much of the case
law concerning derivative works arises from unusual situations
in which the reproduction right is not violated, but the derivative right is not in issue. This can occur, for example, when
someone purchases the original work, alters it, and resells it.
Purchasing a work and reselling it unaltered would be protected by the first sale doctrine,250 so the copyright holder relies
on the derivative right instead. Such cases often seem to reflect
novel forms of intellectual property protection in search of a
textual hook in copyright law, and the derivative right may
serve as a substitute for European-style moral rights. Perhaps
the derivative right should serve a number of functions, though
it also may be that the derivative right serves such functions
only because it otherwise would seem to lack an independent
justification. My purpose here, in any event, is to consider application of the derivative right pursuant to the core justification that I have developed here, not to contemplate the possibility that the derivative right might serve as the basis of a very
different argument.
Let us start with the different results in Mirage Editions,
Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co.,251 and Lee v. A.R.T. Co.252 In
both cases, the defendant A.R.T. was in the business of cutting
up art reproductions, mounting the reproductions individually
onto ceramic tiles, and selling the resulting tile art.253 In Mirage, the reproductions came from a commemorative book collecting the work of a single artist,254 while in Lee, the reproductions appeared individually on notecards and lithographs.255
The Ninth Circuit found a violation of the derivative right in

250. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000) (allowing an individual who purchases a
copyrighted work to resell that work without violating the copyright).
251. 856 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988).
252. 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997).
253. Id. at 580; Mirage, 856 F.2d at 1342.
254. Mirage, 856 F.2d at 1342.
255. Lee, 125 F.3d at 580.
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Mirage,256 but the Seventh Circuit did not in Lee.257 Although
Judge Easterbrook in the Seventh Circuit explicitly declined to
follow the Ninth Circuit,258 the analysis in this paper provides a
plausible, though not definitive, basis for harmonizing the two
cases.
The plaintiffs in Mirage presumably were not concerned
about the tiles interfering with sales of the book, but rather
about the loss of possible sales from other derivative works of
the underlying art.259 This fits squarely within the proposed
test for violation of the derivative right. In Lee, however, the
concern presumably was that the tiles might compete directly
with the original notecards and lithographs, perhaps even making the originals seem like cheaper, less attractive products.260
A ceramic tile artwork may be a close substitute for a lithograph, which, unlike a book, a consumer is likely to hang on the
wall. Such substitution is directly relevant under this Article’s
test only for analysis of the reproduction right, but the reproduction right was irrelevant because no actual reproduction occurred.261
So far as the facts of Lee reveal, the only derivative works
of the underlying art that Lee hoped to shield from competition
were the notecards and lithographs themselves,262 but this type
of competition is no greater than would have existed if A.R.T.
had simply resold the notecards and lithographs, a type of competition that the first sale doctrine protects.263 While in Mirage
the plaintiffs appear to have been genuinely concerned with

256. Mirage, 856 F.2d at 1344.
257. Lee, 125 F.3d at 583.
258. Id.
259. The Ninth Circuit noted that the artist’s work had appeared in many
different forms. Mirage, 856 F.2d at 1342 (“Patrick Nagel was an artist whose
works appeared in many media including lithographs, posters, serigraphs, and
as graphic art in many magazines . . . .”). There was no similar statement in
Lee.
260. Lee, 125 F.3d at 582.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 580–81.
263. Judge Easterbrook explicitly indicated concern that Lee’s theory
seemed to imply that it would make criminals out of art purchasers who
framed prints that they had bought. Id. (“If mounting works a ‘transformation,’ then changing a painting’s frame or a photograph’s mat equally produces
a derivative work. Indeed, if Lee is right about the meaning of the definition's
first sentence, then any alteration of a work, however slight, requires the author's permission.”).
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business stealing from authorized adaptations,264 in Lee, the
plaintiffs appear to be attempting to use the derivative right
only as a backstop to the reproduction right.265 A.R.T.’s actions
might have seemed more troubling if Lee had separately been
marketing tile versions of the art, or if such marketing would
have been a likely avenue of commercial exploitation in the absence of A.R.T.’s adaptation. Under this hypothetical, there
would be a violation of the derivative right as defined here, but
the possibility of such business stealing from authorized adaptations is not as apparent in Lee as in Mirage.
This analysis helps identify what should be the focus of the
current controversy regarding CleanFlicks,266 a company that
purchases and then alters VHS and DVD movies to eliminate
content such as foul language, nudity, and violence that some
consumers find offensive, and rents the videos to consumers.267
Because the company purchases the videos, there is no violation of the reproduction right.268 Whether there is a violation of
the derivative right as conceived here depends on whether the
sanitized films might compete with alternative transformations
that the copyright owners plausibly might create to generate
profits. Where this is so, there is at least a possibility of economic harm. The copyright owner has an interest in controlling
investments in improvements and alterations, and CleanFlicks
plausibly might prevent a copyright owner from selling clean
versions, including perhaps made-for-television versions, at as
high a premium as it otherwise would be able to obtain. As always, there are benefits to such competition, but copyright law
plausibly maximizes social welfare by preventing redundant
creation of derivative works. If creation of an authorized clean
version is unlikely to be a profitable means of exploiting the

264. See Mirage, 856 F.2d at 1342–43.
265. See Lee, 125 F.3d at 582.
266. See Clean Flicks Home Page, http://www.cleanflicks.com (last visited
Nov. 5, 2005).
267. For a discussion of litigation relating to this practice, see Mary
Meehan, Cleaning Agents: Rental Companies ‘Scrub’ DVDs for G-Rated Viewing While the Issue Plays Through the Courts, LEXINGTON- HERALD LEADER,
July 12, 2003, at H1; see also Rick Lyman, Hollywood Balks at High Tech
Sanitizers; Some Video Customers Want Tamer Films, and Entrepreneurs
Rush to Comply, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2002, at E1 (discussing filmmakers' reactions to the proliferation of companies that produce ‘sanitized’ versions of
Hollywood films).
268. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
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original movie, and if the unauthorized clean version would not
interfere with other potential authorized transformations, then
the danger of rent dissipation from redundant adaptations is
much lower.
Even more offensive to many consumers than sex and violence is advertising, and the scope of derivative works was an
issue in the controversy over the automatic ad-skipping feature
of ReplayTV.269 Content producers feared this feature even
more than they feared the remote control and the fast-forward
button.270 Those features similarly allow consumers to skip
commercials but require television watchers to lift their fingers
to achieve the desired effect and therefore may often be too
much trouble.271 While the content producers’ real concern was
that consumers would not pay the time price that they levy for
access to their content, they did not focus on alleged violation of
their reproduction right.272 The content producers claimed that
the ReplayTV created an unauthorized derivative work, producing a television show minus the ads.273 Does ReplayTV
compete with plausible authorized transformations of television
shows? Television networks do repackage content into ad-free
DVDs, but these typically appear sufficiently after the original
air date that competition seems likely to be minimal. In theory,
content producers might offer ad-free versions of programming
on alternative premium cable television stations, but they do
not appear on the verge of doing this. Thus, the ad-skipping
feature likely should not count as contributing to creation of infringing derivative works under current market conditions, but
this might change in the future.

269. ReplayTV’s manufacturer eventually resolved the lawsuit by removing
the ability to skip commercials automatically. See Eric A. Taub, ReplayTV’s
New Owners Drop Features that Riled Hollywood, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2003,
at C1. Owners of ReplayTV units filed a declaratory judgment suit against the
plaintiffs in the original action. Newmark v. Turner Broad. Network, 226 F.
Supp. 2d 1215, 1217–18 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (discussing the lawsuit that also involved other copyright issues, and resolving threshold motions).
270. See Taub, supra note 269, at C1.
271. Id.
272. The argument here would need to be that the ReplayTV contributorily
infringed by encouraging consumer taping, but this argument has little to do
with the ad-skipping feature. Moreover, it seems a stretch given Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, which held that “time shifting” (recording a televised
program to watch later) on a Betamax video tape recorder was fair use. 464
U.S. 417, 454–56 (1984).
273. See Taub, supra note 269, at C1.

ABRAMOWICZ_3FMT

384

12/22/2005 10:49:18 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:317

As a final example of the scope of the derivative right, consider the permissibility of unauthorized appropriation art,274
which incorporates artistic or other images into new contexts,
often in an effort to comment critically on the original.275 A recent case, for example, considered whether a sculpture of a photograph of puppies infringed the photograph.276 The rent dissipation approach would emphasize that the copyright owners
were extremely unlikely to exploit their photograph by creating
a sculptural work that would make a presumably ironic comment on the original, and therefore no rent dissipating competition resulted. With other photographs—for example, the now
famous photograph of firemen lifting the American flag at the
World Trade Center site277—exploitation by the author might
have been more likely. It is irrelevant that the puppy photograph copyright owners might have been willing to license the
sculpture, for the concern is with destructive competition, not
with the original copyright owners’ profits per se. It is also possible, of course, that the puppy sculpture might be protected
under fair use, but my analysis makes it unnecessary to even
consider whether fair use applies.
2. The Reproduction Right
Just as my approach to the derivative right could save appropriation art, so too might this Article’s approach to the reproduction right save artistic and musical genres that involve
the combination of large numbers of copyrighted works. Consider, for example, collages of copyrighted works, where the assembled works are owned by many copyright owners. There is a
strong case based on transaction costs for allowing such works
without permission, because it might be very expensive to con-

274. For a discussion of copyright issues associated with appropriation art,
see William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images and Appropriation Art:
An Economic Approach 15 (Chi. John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper
No. 113, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=253332 (follow “Document Delivery” hyperlink; then follow “Download the document from: Social
Science Research Network” hyperlink).
275. For examples of appropriation art, see MNAC Artist Registry, Metropolitan Nashville Arts Commission, http://www.artsnashville.org/registry/
index.php?scan=msst&main=style&offset=0&id=19 (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
276. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 301 (2d Cir. 1992).
277. See Christine Temin, Memorializing an Iconic Moment, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 16. 2002, at D1 (discussing the photograph and the controversy
over a plan to turn it into a sculpture).
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tact the many copyright owners of each of the included works
for permission and to change a work should permission not be
granted. Furthermore, an application of fair use, infused with
transaction costs considerations, might save such an art form
anyway.278 In the ordinary case, however, collages will not substitute for the original copyrighted work, and the reproduction
right would not be violated under this Article’s test, even
though direct copying was involved. At the same time, few
copyright owners will exploit copyrighted works by creating or
licensing collages, so the derivative right is not violated either.
Similarly, this interpretation could save “sound sampling,”279 at
least where the sound sampling combines a sufficiently large
number of songs to make the end product neither a substitute
for, nor a competitor with, any authorized transformation of
any single work. The interpretation thus calls into question, for
example, the Sixth Circuit’s recent decision in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films,280 which concluded that a sound
recording owner had an exclusive right to sample his own recording.
C. INDEPENDENT COPYRIGHTABILITY OF DERIVATIVE WORKS
Although my primary purpose in developing this economic
approach is to help determine whether the derivative and reproduction rights have been violated, the analysis also may be
of direct use in case law considering the amount of originality
required for a derivative work to obtain an independent copyright. Such cases typically arise when works are created from
material in the public domain.281 They may also arise when a
copyright owner copyrights a derivative work of an already
copyrighted work, and the first copyrighted work subsequently
enters the public domain, or when the creator of the new work
has a license to use preexisting work and seeks to obtain an in-

278. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1600, 1628–30 (1982) (discussing the transactions cost approach to fair
use doctrine).
279. See generally Erick J. Bohlman, Comment, Squeezing the Square Peg
of Digital Sound Sampling into the Round Hole of Copyright Law: Who Will
Pay the Piper?, 5 SOFTWARE L.J. 797 (1992) (reviewing copyright law concerning sound sampling).
280. 383 F.3d 390, 397 (6th Cir. 2004), aff ’d, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
281. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491–92 (2d Cir.
1976) (en banc).
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dependent copyright.282 The doctrine in this area has been inconsistent. While some courts have required no more than a
“distinguishable variation” from the original for a work to obtain copyright,283 others have emphasized that merely trivial
variations will not be enough.284
The analysis above suggests one possibility: an authorized
work should count as an independently copyrightable derivative work if, had it not been authorized and had the earlier
work been protected by copyright, the new work would violate
the derivative right but not the reproduction right under this
Article’s proposed definitions. Thus, an authorized work would
be entitled to a copyright as a derivative work if it was sufficiently different from the original that it would not significantly compete with the original and yet sufficiently similar
that it might compete with authorized transformations of the
original.285 Ensuring that a work would not be within the reproduction right may seem to be an obvious way of preventing
trivial modifications from entitling a work to an independent
copyright. Under current doctrine, however, the reproduction
and derivative rights overlap to such an extent that this definition would mean that virtually no works would qualify. Regardless of whether courts enact this Article’s proposed reformulation of the reproduction right, they could use its
conceptualization of that right to identify works that are too
similar to the original to qualify for an independent copyright.
Consider, for example, Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, in
which Judge Posner found insufficient originality in a painting,
intended for use in a collector’s plate, combining characters and
settings drawn from the movie The Wizard of Oz.286 Judge Pos-

282. See, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909–11 (2d
Cir. 1980) (concluding that the originality requirement has “particular significance in the case of derivative works based on copyrighted preexisting works”).
283. See Dam Things from Denmark v. Russ Berrie & Co., 290 F.3d 548,
565 (3d Cir. 2002); Donald v. Zack Meyer’s T.V. Sales & Serv., 426 F.2d 1027,
1029 (5th Cir. 1970); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102
(2d Cir. 1951).
284. See Boyd, supra note 236, at 353–61.
285. The consequence of failing the second part of the test would be less
severe than the consequence of failing the first. If a transformation were so
radical that the new work would not compete with either the original or with
authorized transformations of the original, then it would be entitled to a copyright as an independent work.
286. 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983).
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ner concluded that “a derivative work must be substantially
different from the underlying work to be copyrightable.”287
Judge Posner, however, did not provide a framework for determining what counts as “substantially different.” A collector’s
plate with an image adapted from the movie would not effect
substantial demand diversion from the movie itself, so it would
not violate the reproduction right, even though it would be a
derivative work. Under the test proposed here, it therefore
would be entitled to an independent copyright.288 Of course, if
owners of copyright in The Wizard of Oz previously had created
a similar collector’s plate that would be a market substitute for
the new collector’s plate,289 then the new plate might well infringe the original plate, if the substantial similarity requirement is met.290
287. Id.
288. The same result probably would not obtain if the plate merely consisted of a frame from the movie, for two reasons. First, although the economic
approach rejects the proposition that adding original content is sufficient to
create a derivative work, it does not question the proposition that some originality is necessary for creation of a derivative work. Slapping a movie still on a
plate encompasses only trivial originality. Second, each frame of a movie itself
would be an independently copyrighted work. See supra note 248. It seems
plausible that collectors’ plates would interfere directly with any efforts to
market individual movie stills in any form, and not solely with efforts to market transformations of these frames onto plates.
289. Indeed, in Gracen, the Wizard of Oz copyright owners did market a
separate collector’s plate, although it is not clear whether that plate was created first. 698 F.2d at 304. The issue was probably irrelevant in Gracen itself,
because the court suggested, without reaching the issue, that Gracen, the
creator of the purportedly derivative work, did not have the necessary permission to seek an independent copyright on the derivative work. Id. at 305 (“[W]e
do not think the difference is enough to allow her to copyright her painting
even if, as we very much doubt, she was authorized by Bradford to do so.”).
290. Posner justified the “substantially different” requirement by citing
courts’ evidentiary need to determine whether subsequent works built on the
original, the purportedly derivative work, or on other derivative works. Id. at
304. Judge Posner thus might lament that it will be necessary to consider the
type of evidentiary question that he had sought to avoid. What he did not acknowledge, however, is that it often will be necessary to consider whether derivative works infringe one another or merely build on the original, when the
original is in the public domain. He may have ignored this point only because
of the unusual posture of Gracen itself, where Gracen’s purported derivative
work was an authorized licensee of the original. Id. at 301. Judge Posner was
understandably concerned that the Wizard of Oz copyright holders would have
to defend themselves against allegations that they had copied Gracen’s plate,
rather than making their own. Id. But Gracen would bear the burden of proof
on an infringement claim, and this factual scenario is sufficiently unusual that
it should not determine the broader doctrine determining copyrightability of a
derivative work.
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CONCLUSION
Abolition of the derivative right would have large consequences, quite possibly negative. Copyright races would force
authors to hurry creation of adaptations of their own works.
Unauthorized adaptations, meanwhile, might provide some
value to consumers, but these works might simply reflect shifts
in resources from production of more original copyrighted
works, as well as from other markets. The derivative right, of
course, is in no great danger, and indeed the larger danger is
that the derivative right will be interpreted too broadly. This
Article’s task has been to defend the existence of the derivative
right, but the theoretical apparatus that the Article has supplied may, in practice, be most important for constraining aggressive interpretations of the derivative and reproduction
rights. Courts should not extend the derivative right to works
that would not compete with plausible authorized transformations, nor should they extend the reproduction right to works
that would not compete with the original.

